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STANDING TO INTERVENE 
CARL TOBIAS* 
I.. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has rarely considered what applicants must 
show to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a)(2) since the Court amended the provision in 1966. 1 This dearth 
of Supreme Court treatment has meant that primary responsibility for 
interpreting Rule 24(a)(2) has devolved upon the lower federal courts. 
Many of these courts and numerous commentators have recognized 
that it is very difficult to identify precisely what the Rule demands of 
those that seek to intervene of right. During much of the last quarter 
century, however, the federal judiciary agreed about one important 
proposition: Rule 24(a)(2) does not require that intervention applicants 
possess standing to sue. An increasing number of circuit and district 
courts, however, recently demanded or suggested that applicants have 
an "interest" greater than, or equal to, that necessary for standing or 
comply with certain standing requirements. Indeed, in 1986, the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that the "Courts of Appeals have reached 
varying conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of 
right must himself possess standing."2 The Court, nonetheless, ex-
pressly declined to decide whether an applicant "must satisfy not only 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Susan Bandes, Bob Bone, 
Bill Luneburg, Rick Marcus, Rick Matasar and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Mar-
garet Bentwood, Peggy Hesse and Tom Orr for valuable research assistance, Cecelia Palmer 
for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that 
remain are mine. 
1. Rule 24(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
(a} Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: 
... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
Rule 24(a)(2) governs non-statutory intervention of right. Rule 24(a)( I) covers statutory in-
tervention of right, when Congress prescribes intervention of right in substantive legislation, 
and Rule 24(b) applies to permissive intervention, intervention which courts have discretion 
to grant. FED. R. C1v. P. 24. 
2. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 n. 21 (1986). 
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the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Article 
III."3 
The Court's reserv:ation of the question for future decision and 
the increasing disagreement among lower federal courts regarding the 
relevance of standing to intervention have created confusion in the 
application of Rule 24(a)(2). The courts' interpretations have compli-
cated, and even precluded, participation in lawsuits by certain appli-
cants; particularly public interest litigants, such as the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the 
Sierra Club. The treatment has prevented affected interests from being 
heard, while the federal judiciary has lost helpful expertise, information 
and perspectives needed to make the best substantive decisions. The 
invocation of standing in the intervention of right context has been 
inadvisable, and its effects recently have worsened. Until the Supreme 
Court resolves the question of standing's relevance to intervention of 
right, litigants increasingly will ask that federal courts find standing 
applicable to Rule 24(a)(2), and these requests will engender greater 
uncertainty, cost, and hardship. It is important, therefore, to analyze 
this issue. 
The first section of this Article explores the background and ju-
dicial application of standing to sue and the history of intervention of 
right. The ideas have different origins and serve dissimilar purposes, 
although both implicate what entities need to participate in litigation. 
Standing basically entails what a plaintiff must demonstrate to initiate 
suit and Article Ill's requirement that there be a case or controversy 
between the parties. In comparison, intervention of right involves what 
an absentee must show to participate in ongoing litigation, as to which 
the plaintiff has standing and whose resolution may prejudice the ap-
plicant, and Rule 24{a)(2)'s requirements that an applicant have an 
inadequately represented interest which will be impaired. 
The secon~ part assesses the enforcement of Rule 24(a)(2) since 
its revision in 1966. The federal judiciary has experienced considerable 
difficulty in delineating exactly what applicants must demonstrate to 
intervene of right, but few courts have mentioned standing. Over the 
last decade, a growing number of judges has insisted that applicants 
possess an interest more substantial than, or identical to, that necessary 
for standing or satisfy various standing requirements. That enforcement 
has restricted, and occasionally prevented, the participation of public 
interest litigants and has deprived courts of valuable input. Until the 
Supreme Court resolves the issue, plaintiffs and defendants increasingly 
3. Id. at 69. 
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will request that judges consider standing relevant to intervention of 
right, and this will create mounting confusion, expense and hardship. 
The third section analyzes the opinions of those courts that have 
stated or suggested that standing implicates Rule 24(a)(2). The federal 
judiciary has provided little justification for the invocation of standing, 
and the Rule's history, language and underlying policies lend minimal 
support to such application. Moreover, the evaluation shows that the 
standing and intervention inquiries essentially are, and should remain, 
discrete. The courts; therefore, should sharply circumscribe their reli-
ance on standing. These conclusions do not necessarily mean that 
standing is wholly irrelevant. Indeed, standing is critical to intervention 
of right in one sense: the policies that underlie sta~ding help. to define 
the idea of a case and to identify appropriate parties to participate in 
litigation. A case is a vehicle for facilitating the federal judiciary's per-
formance of its quintessential responsibilities-explicating public val-
ues in the Constitution and statutes and requiring compliance with 
them by governmental entities. The party structure of a case, accord-
ingly, should include litigants that can facilitate the efficacious discharge 
of these judicial duties. 
The final part of the Article offers suggestions for future application 
of standing to Rule 24(a}(2). The segment recasts intervention of right 
jurisprudence, drawing on transformed conceptualizations of the idea 
of a case and of the federal judiciary's role in public' law litigation. The 
approach is a pragmatic, fair, and sensitive adjustment of the traditional 
intervention mechanism to the practicalities of modem litigation. Its 
implementation should enable courts to improve their substantive de-
cisionmaking and achieve judicial economy. ' 
II. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND THE "LIBERALIZATION" OF 
ST ANDING AND INTERVENTION 
Many developments, certain of which are interrelated, occurred 
throughout the twentieth century that implicate standing and inter-
vention of right. 4 A number of these events led to the transformation 
of considerable federal civil litigation and to new ways of conceptual-
4. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 271-96 (1989). From approximately the mid-l960s until the late 1970s, 
the federal judiciary "liberalized" standing and intervention of right in the sense of being 
more willing to permit participation in litigation by entities that sought to initiate suit or 
intervene in cases. Since around 1980, courts generally have been less willing to grant standing 
or intervention and have invoked standing in the intervention of right context specifically 
to limit intervention. The restrictions on standing and intervention appear primarily to be 
responses to the litigation explosion, but they also may reflect a lack of solicitude for pu.blic 
interest litigants or the interests they seek to vindicate in litigation. 
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izing standing and intervention between the mid-l 960s and the mid-
l 970s. 5 This part initially examines those general developments most 
important to standing and intervention of right and then considers the 
background and judicial application of standing and the history of in-
tervention of right. 
A. Growth and Development of Public Law Litigation 
From approximately 1965 to 1975, a multitude of developments 
altered the nature of much federal civil litigation and the understand-
ings of what entities seeking to institute or intervene in these lawsuits 
needed to show. Public interest litigants increased their participatiop 
in federal cases, and public law litigation grew. Federal judges created 
novel substantive rights and expanded those previously recognized, 
while they were more receptive to citizen involvement in agency pro-
ceedings and courtroom litigation. Congress enacted "social" legislation 
that fostered such participation by the statutes' intended beneficiaries. 
Public interest litigants capitalized on certain aspects of the equity-
based Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that facilitated their involve-
ment in lawsuits, and courts applied the Rules in ways that were so-
licitous of these parties' needs. 
Public interest litigants are individuals or groups that pursue in 
the administrative sphere or in the courtroom rights and interests of 
unrepresented persons adversely affected by the activities oflarge public 
or private entities.6 Public interest litigants differ in several important 
respects from parties they typically oppose, such as the government 
and members of regulated industries, namely corporations. 7 Nearly all 
public interest litigants have considerably less time and money to spend 
than their opponents, and the resource deficiencies of numerous public 
·interest litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs, can make them risk-
averse. 8 
The most significant precursors of modern public interest liti-
gants-the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and 
legal aid offices created to furnish urban poor persons with legal ser-
5. See id. at 279-87; Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party 
Joinder, 65 N.C.L. REV. 745, 754-57 ( 1987). 
6. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 745 n.I, 756; Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public 
Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in 
Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 906, 941-45 (1982). See generally N. ARON, 
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL PUBLIC INTEREST LAw IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989). 
7. Public interest litigants typically oppose regulated industries in public interest 
litigation, but the litigants may oppose government in all forms of public law litigation. See 
infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
8. See Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 495-
98 (1988-89) (civil rights plaintiffs); N. ARON, supra note 6, at 52-62 (public interest litigants). 
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vices-pursued civil lawsuits in the early twentieth century.9 It was not 
until the 1960s, however, that these entities and today's public interest 
litigants, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), be-
came actively involved in the kinds of cases that typify modern public 
law suits. 10 
The rights and interests that public interest litigants normally seek 
to vindicate are relatively intangible, abstract, ideological, collective or 
public in character, such as concern for liberty or air quality. These 
often contrast markedly with other parties' rights and interests, which 
are concrete, common law, individual or private in nature, such as real 
property or a contract. 11 Public interest litigants also provide unique 
expertise, information and perspectives and the input of public interest 
litigants can improve administrative and judicial decisionmaking. 12 
Public law litigation comprises lawsuits that vindicate significant 
social values affecting large numbers of people. 13 Many aspects of this 
litigation are unlike traditional private, two-party cases. For instance, 
the subject matter of public law litigation may be the practices or pol-
ici~s of enormous units of government or multinational corporations, 
while the cases can be exceedingly complex, involving hundreds of 
issues and thousands of parties. 14 
"Institutional reform" litigation was one important form of public 
law litigation experiencing considerable growth between 1965 and 
197 5. 15 Institutional suits seek to improve the operation of substantial 
agencies or governmental institutions, such as prisons and schools. 16 
Another type of public law litigation increasing considerably both dur-
9. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 
21-57 (1976); Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. 
L. REV. 207, 209-24 ( 1976). 
10. See Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439-41 (1984); Rabin, 
supra note 9, at 212, 216-17. 
11. See Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 282-83 (1990); Tobias, 
supra note 4, at 323-25. 
12. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 941-45 (agency decisionmaking); Tobias, supra note 
· 4, at 329 (judicial decisionmaking). 
13. The classic treatment is Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). See also Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The 
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I (1979). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(police lieutenants' examination as subject matter); Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310, 
1311, 1315-17 (6th Cir. 1989) (complex party structure); opinions in In re "Agent Orange 
Product Liability Litigation," 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (complex issues); see also 
Chayes, supra note 13, at 1302. 
15. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 279-82; see also Chayes, supra note 13. 
16. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Fallon, 
Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, · 
59 N.Y.U.L. REV. I n.I (1984). For more discussion of the litigation's characteristics, see 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 279-82. 
420 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
ing that time and since is "public interest litigation." 17 These cases 
vindicate the political, moral or ideological interests of many individ-
uals in trying to guarantee proper governmental decisionmaking. 18 A 
prototypical, and the predominant, kind of public interest litigation 
challenges administrative determinations of federal agencies. Many of 
these suits now have at least a tri-polar party structure, which typically 
includes the government, public interest litigants, and regulated inter-
ests or their representatives, such as trade associations. 
When resolving public law suits, judges assume different roles than 
in private litigation. Perhaps most important, they give substantive 
content to public norms in constitutional or statutory provisio,ns that 
underlie the cases and attempt to prevent or correct inappropriate gov-
ernmental behavior. 19 Judges also manage the litigation more closely 
in several ways. In institutional reform cases, for example, courts may 
undertake major responsibility for fact-gathering, even appointing ad-
juncts such as special masters, to fulfill what essentially are "quasi-
legislative" or "quasi-administrative" decisional duties.20 
The expansion of public law litigation resulted from numerous 
factors, including the federal judiciary's recognition of new substantive 
rights, its extension of those rights formerly recognized, as well as 
courts' flexible application of procedural requirements and increased 
control over the civil litigation process. 21 The Supreme Court broadly 
interpreted the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, developing, for instance, the concept of "New 
17. The litigation differs from institutional reform litigation in some respects. See 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 282. Recent examples of public interest litigation are Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 317 (1990); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 
U.S. 440 (1989). 
18. The classic treatment is Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The 
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rev. 1033 (1968). Cf. Tobias, supra 
note 4, at 282-83 (more discussion of litigation's characteristics). 
19. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ci. 625 (1990); see also Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095 (1984). 
20. See. e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. 11 (E.D. Tex. 1982); see also Brazil, 
Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 394 ( 1986). 
Another conceptualization of "managerial judging," which partially responds to the 
"litigation explosion," involves close judicial supervision of civil lawsuits not only before 
trial but even from filing to disposition. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire 
Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007 (!st Cir. 1988). See also Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case 
Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. Rev. 70 
(f981); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 374 (1982). The litigation explosion 
is the perception that a substantial number of civil cases are filed, too many of which lack 
merit or exploit procedural mechanisms for tactical advantage. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 
287-92 (more discussion of managerial judging and litigation explosion). 
21. See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. Rev. 1 
(1984); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. Rev. 494 
(1986). 
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Property."22 The Supreme Court and lower federal courts also evinced 
enhanced receptivity to public participation in administrative pro-
ceedings and courtroom litigation23 by, for example, enforcing the Fed-
eral Rules in ways that promoted public interest litigants' active in-
volvement in civil cases. 24 
Federal legislative activity contributed to a number of the devel-
opments. 25 From the mid-l 960s to the mid-l 970s, Congress passed 
many statutes that certain observers dubbed "social regulation" or "so-
cial legislation."26 Some statutes were intended to improve the envi-
ronment or to protect consumers, while other measures were meant to 
rectify discrimination. 27 Congress bestowed substantive rights and pro-
cedural advantages-such as liberalized standing and intervention, le-
nient burdens of proof, and reduced requirements for securing attor-
ney's fees-on intended beneficiaries that Congress anticipated would 
vindicate the statutory interests by participating in agency processes or 
litigation. 28 
The equity-premised Federal Rules and the federal courts' gen-
erous application of them were important to these developments.29 In 
the first decade of the twentieth century, growing dissatisfaction with 
common law and code practice and procedure led some leaders of the 
bench and bar to advocate change. Support for reform gradually in-
creased, and after decades of controversy, Congress enacted the Rules 
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (new property). 
23. The classic cases were Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 
F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. I 966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 
615-17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Gellhorn, Public Participa-
tion in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 362-69 ( 1972). 
24. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
25. See Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 
1278-95 (1986); Tobias, supra note 4, at 784-85. 
26. For treatment of "social regulation," see Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation 
in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HisTORICAL 
EssAYS 155 (T. McGraw ed. 1981); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation", 47 Pus. 
INTEREST 49 (Spring 1977). 
27. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-
34 (1988); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1988); Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-el7 (1988). 
28. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (citizen suit provision); Marek 
v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I, 43 (1985) (Appendix to opinion ofBrennan, J., dissenting)( compilation 
of fee-shifting legislation). 
29. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 272-76, 285-87. For analysis of the developments 
that led to the Rules' promulgation in 1938, I rely on Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a 
Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure From The Field Code to the Federal Rules, 
89 CoLUM. L. REv. I (I 989); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 
1014 (1982); Resnik, supra note 21; Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
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Enabling Act of 1934. 30 That legislation empowered the Supreme Court 
to adopt procedural rules for civil litigation in the federal trial courts 
·that became effective in 1938.31 
The Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules had numerous 
objectives for the Rules as a whole and as to specific procedural areas 
and rules. 32 The Committee favored resolution of disputes on the mer-
its and non-technical procedural approaches, evidenced by provision 
for liberal pleading, open-ended discovery, and substantial attorney and 
party control over litigation, especially prior to trial. 33 The drafters' 
decision to merge equity and law was particularly important. 34 This 
meant that equity, not common law, was the source of the Rules' un-
derlying philosophy, while the Rules even exceeded equity's permis-
siveness and flexibility in pleading, discovery and joinder. 35 It is im-
possible to discern whether the Advisory Committee that wrote the 
Federal Rules in the mid-l 930s actually intended to provide specifically 
for modern public law litigation. Nonetheless, the Committee's pur-
poses were consistent with, and probably even fostered, the institution 
and vigorous pursuit of this litigation. 36 · 
From 1938 until the early 1960s, courts and commentators found 
that the Rules functioned rather well, and the federal judiciary expe-
rienced comparatively little difficulty applying them. 37 There were rel-
atively few amendments, and many of these were characterized as "clar-
ifying" changes. 38 Some revisions made the Rules even more 
permissive and flexible. Indeed, the Advisory Committee, in crafting 
the liberalized 1966 party joinder amendments, admonished federal 
courts to apply flexibly and pragmatically the requirements governing 
30. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 amendment); cf Burbank, supra note 29, at 
1045-98 (assessment of developments leading to passage). 
31. See Subrin, supra note 29, at 973; Tobias, supra note 4, at 273. 
32. See Resnik, supra note 21, at 508-15; Subrin, supra note 29, at 922, 973-78. 
Although the Supreme Court has formal statutory authority for promulgating and amending 
the Rules, the Advisory Committee develops proposals for revision which the Court rarely 
changes. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029, 1032 (I 966)(dissenting 
statement of Justice Black). I recognize that reality here by referring to the Committee rather 
than to the Committee, the Court and Congress. 
33. See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986); Subrin, The New Era in American Civil 
Procedure, 61 A.B.A. J. 1648-50 (1981). 
34. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 YALE 
L.J. 387, 415-35 (1935 (contemporaneous advocacy of merger). 
35. See Subrin, supra note 29, at 922, 925-26. 
36. For analysis of relevant materials that reaches the conclusions in the text, see 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 276-77. 
37. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 21, at 515-17; 4 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1008 (1987). 
38. See Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 
STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2 (1976) (few amendments); Clark, Clarifying Amendments to the 
Federal Rules, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (1953) (clarifying amendments). 
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compulsory party joinder (Rule 19), class actions (Rule 23), and in-
tervention of right (Rule 24(a)(2)).39 Many members of the federal 
bench followed this admonition between 1965 and 1975. Some federal 
judges created a "public rights exception" to compulsory party joinder, 
and a number of courts granted intervention of right quite liberally; 
while numerous other judges evidenced greater willingness to certify 
class actions, so that they experienced much more widespread, albeit 
controversial, application.40 Judges generously interpreted additional 
rules, especially those pertaining to pleading and discovery.41 More-
over, the "liberal ethos," which pervaded the Rules as a set oflitigation 
principles, and the flexibility that equity promoted, permitted public 
interest litigants to initiate lawsuits, defeat preliminary motions, un-
dertake thorough discovery, and reach the merits as plaintiffs, and to 
gain intervention rather easily as applicants.42 
In short, the Federal Rules as written and as enforced, together 
with the other developments explored, offered a conducive environ-
ment in which public law litigation could grow and mature. Crucial to 
what happened was the gradual, sustained liberalization of citizen ac-
cess across a broad spectrum of doctrinal areas, including public par-
ticipation in agency proceedings, standing to commence litigation, and 
the right to intervene in lawsuits.43 Against this backdrop, the specific 
concepts of standing and intervention of right will be analyzed more 
closely. 
B. Standing 
Throughout much of the country's history, there was no discrete 
body of standing law,44 and the question of standing turned on whether 
39. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 19, 39 F.R.D. 89 (1966); Rule 23, id. 
at 98; and Rule 24(a)(2), id. at 109; cf Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 
84 MtcH. L. REv. 1463, 1479 (1987) ("the 1966 amendments made the triumph [of equity} 
complete"). 
40. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 757-59 (public rights exception); Miller, Of Fran-
kenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem", 92 
HARV. L. REv. 664 ( 1979) (class actions). 
41. See Miller, supra note 21, at 8-9, 14-15; Tobias, supra note 4, at 285-87. 
42. See Miller, supra note 21, at 14-15; Subrin, supra note 29, at 968. 
43. See Resnik, supra note 21, at 516; Tobias, Toward An Independent Public Law, 
4 ADM IN. L.J. 143 ( 1990). See generally supra note 4. 
44. Standing warrants comparatively less treatment here because others have com-
petently chronicled relevant developments and because intervention of right is the predom-
inant concern of this Article. I principally treat standing to seek judicial review of agency 
action, supplementing that with analysis of additional areas when they are pertinent to the 
Article's central concerns. In discussing standing, I thus rely substantially on Sunstein, Stand-
ing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988). For recent valuable 
examination of standing, see Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); 
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1371 ( 1988). Cf Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 68 n. 3 ( 1984) (catalog 
of earlier scholarship). See also J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). 
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positive law recognized a cause of action.45 The requirement that plain-
tiffs possess something in the nature of a common law right to sue 
meant that regulated interests, such as public utilities, were able to 
challenge governmental activity in court but that competitors and reg-
ulatory beneficiaries, such as purchasers of consumer goods, could 
not.46 This private law construct of standing reflected the convergence 
of two distinct groups of concepts: first, that federal courts were to 
prevent governmental intrusions into common law interests and sec-
ond, thatjusticiability doctrines, namely standing, should be employed 
to minimize the judiciary's intervention in governmental decision-
making. 47 
Over time, the federal courts repudiated this private law approach 
to standing in two fundamental ways. One was to find that statutorily-
protected interests were cognizable. 48 The other was the development 
of the notion of "surrogate standing," whereby Congress permitted 
specific individuals or groups that lacked interests protected by legis-
lation to vindicate the interests of the public,. essentially serving as 
private attorneys general.49 Congress codified these premises for stand-
ing in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), adopted in 1946: "A 
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."5° Congress intended "le-
gal wrong" to encompass injury to constitutional, common law, and 
statutory interests, and "adversely affected or aggrieved" to permit sur-
rogate standing, provided that the substantive measure so prescribed.51 
Neither the APA's language nor its legislative history clearly stated if, 
and when, regulatory beneficiaries would have standing. 52 Nonetheless, 
in the mid-l 960s, numerous circuit courts read the statutorily protected 
interest component of the legal wrong idea in ways that permitted the 
beneficiaries to challenge the legality of agency decisionmaking. 53 
45. See J. VINING, supra note 44, at 55; Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1044; Winter, supra 
note 44, at 1395-96. 
46. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1723 (1975); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1436. 
47. See Stewart, supra note 46, at 1724 (first group); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 
1438 (both groups). · 
48. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); The Chicago Junction 
Case, 264 U.S. 258, 262-69 ( 1924); see also Stewart, supra note 46, at 1725-30. 
49. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940); see 
also Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1439. 
50. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
51. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1440-41. 
52. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1946);ATT'Y GEN. COMM. 
ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., !st Sess. 84 (1941). 
53. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 
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The federal judiciary could have employed these concepts to 
elaborate the legal wrong test in a manner that would have provided 
statutory beneficiaries expansive standing. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court adopted a different approach to standing in the 1970 landmark 
case of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp. 54 
The Court required that plaintiffs suffer an injury in fact which was 
arguably within the zone of interests protected by the applicable con-
stitutional or statutory command. 55 The Court thus substituted for the 
legal interest test a factual inquiry into whether injury existed. 
For a number of years, the Data Processing articulation appeared 
to work reasonably well, facilitating the development of a standing 
doctrine of considerable coherence. The "arguably within the zone" 
requirement functioned pragmatically as a feasible, liberal threshold 
test. 56 In time, however, sharp criticism of Data Processing arose. 57 
The injury-in-fact test alone eventually became inadequate to the task 
of determining who, of the substantial number of people and interests 
affected by agency decisions in an integrated economy, should have 
standing. 58 
In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court employed several concepts 
to restrict open-ended access to the courts. 59 Ultimately the Court 
developed requirements to supplement the injury-in-fact test. Plaintiffs 
now must show that they have suffered some actual . or threatened 
harm, which is "distinct and palpable," not abstract, conjectural or 
hypothetical.60 Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged unlawful behavior of the defendant.61 Finally, there must be a 
substantial likelihood that plaintiWs injury will be redressed by a 
favorable determination. 62 The Court presently characterizes these 
F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 
615-17 (2d Cir. 1965). 
54. 397 U.S. 150 ( 1970). 
55. Id. at 153. 
56. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 4 79 U.S. 388, 395-400 ( 1987); see also 
Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1450. 
57. See, e.g., Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 41, 43-44; 
Stewart, Standing for Solidarity (Book Review), 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1569 ( 1979). 
58. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395-97; see also J. VINING, supra note 44, at 32. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The concepts were 
not especially applicable to administrative law and plausible arguments underlie most of 
them. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1451. 
60. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 100 (1979); accord Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. 
Ct. 1717, 1723 (1990); Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1989); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
61. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); 
accord Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 1704 ( 1991 ); Allen, 
468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
62. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 41; accord County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 
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restrictions as constitutional in nature. 63 
The Supreme Court also has imposed a set of prudential limita-
tions, essentially to protect the judiciary's prerogatives and resources, 
and plaintiffs must meet the restrictions, even when they have satisfied 
the constitutional requirements.64 Plaintiffs generally must assert their 
own legal interests and rights, rather than those of third parties.65 Plain-
tiffs cannot vindicate " 'abstract questions of wide public significance' 
[amounting to] 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches."66 The Court 
essentially considers· the zone of interest test a prudential require-
ment. 67 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have more readily 
found that plaintiffs possess standing in the major category of cases 
that challenge agency decisionmaking under Section 702 of the AP A. 68 
For instance, the Court recently observed that the zone of interest 
requirement is "not meant to be especially demanding" and charac-
terized it as a guide for determining whether, in light of "Congress' 
evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable," a 
specific plaintiff should be heard to challenge a particular administra-
tive judgment. 69 Indeed, until this Term, the Court had never rejected 
standing because a plaintiff failed to satisfy the zone test. 70 
The Supreme Court has articulated numerous justifications for 
standing, although the opinions do not always clearly state how stand-
ing's requirements effectuate its ostensible purposes. 71 The Court has 
observed that Article III standing law is "built on a single basic idea-
the idea of separation of powers."72 Correspondingly, the Court has 
111 S. 0. 1661, 1667 (1991); Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1723; Asarco, 490 U.S. at 614-16; 
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. 
63. See, e.g., Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. a. 2173, 2180 (1991); Allen, 468 U.S. at 
751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472-74. 
64. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75. 
65. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. a. 2077, 2087 (1991); 
United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990); Secretary of State v. Joseph 
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58 (1984). . 
66. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 
(1975)); accord Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). 
67. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987). 
68. This category is in comparison to cases that invoke constitutional provisions 
or implicate taxpayer or citizen standing. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop 
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
69. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. The Supreme Court's technical treatment in two very 
recent cases may retreat somewhat from Clarke. See Air Courier Conf. v. American Postal 
Workers Union, 111 S. 0. 913 (1991); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. 0. 3177 
(1990). 
70. See Air Courier Conj., 111 S. <:;t. at 915; See also Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186-87; 
Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1445 n.56. Of course, the lower courts have followed the Supreme 
Court's articulation of standing. Recent examples are North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 
1239 (7th Cir. 1991); Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
71. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1438 (standing restrictions justified on basis 
of policies having minimal or no relationship to standing). 
72. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
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recognized that the exercise of judicial power affects relationships 
among the co-equal branches of the federal government, most pro-
foundly when the judiciary declares activity of the political branches 
unconstitutional. 73 The Court also has remarked that standing helps 
to insure that legal issues presented to federal courts will be resolved 
"in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of 
the consequences of judicial action."74 Moreover, the Court has inti-
mated that standing reflects respect for the autonomy of people who 
are likely to be affected most directly by a judicial determination.75 
Another justification for standing is that it guarantees efficacious or 
sincere advocacy. 76 Standing restrictions are said as well to be mech-
anisms for reducing the civil caseload. 77 
Some judges and many commentators have criticized the Supreme 
Court's standing jurisprudence. 78 The Court's enunciation of standing 
requirements has been unclear and inconsistent, aspects the Court itself 
has been compelled to admit. 79 The Supreme Court has granted stand-
ing in cases when it should have been denied and rejected standing in 
situations when it should have been found, results which often appear 
to reflect a majority's views on the merits. 80 Moreover, the Court has 
supported certain standing limitations with policies only minimally 
related to standing. 81 Furthermore, the Court, in articulating the stand-
ing.requirements, has evinced little concern that they be consistent with 
closely related justiciability concepts, such as mootness, or with ad-
ditional relevant court access doctrines and ideas pertaining to a case's 
structure, like pendent jurisdiction and intervention of right. 82 
73. See, e.g .. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982). 
74. Id. at 472; accord Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 
955 ( 1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 ( 1972). 
75. See Brilmayer, Judi cal Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law 
Method, 57 B.U.L. REv. 807, 823-24 ( 1977); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill: 
Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 312-15 (1979). 
76. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472-73. 
77. See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Public Law Lit· 
igation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18-26 (1982); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 
1448 n. 74. 
78. See. e.g., sources cited in Nichol, supra note 44, at 68 n.3. 
79. "We need not mince words when we say that the concept of'Art. III Standing' 
has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this 
Court .... " Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; accord Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 ( 1984). 
80. See Chayes, supra note 77, at 14-22; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1448. 
81. For instance, although standing limitations are said to insure efficacious or 
sincere advocacy, public interest litigants, like the Sierra Club, that have not suffered injury 
in fact, are especially likely to be effective advocates. See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1044; Meltzer, 
Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants 
as Private Attorneys General, 88 Co LUM. L. REV. 247, 295-313 ( 1988). See generally supra 
note 76 and accompanying text. 
82. See Bandes, supra note 1 I, at 227-29, 235-55. 
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Standing, therefore, has traditionally been viewed as what the fed-
eral judiciary demands of those who wish to commence litigation. The 
Supreme Court has observed: "In essence the question of standing is 
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of 
the dispute or of particular issues. " 83 Intervention of right, by com-
parison, is what judges require ofan applicant that wishes to participate 
in litigation, in which the plaintiff has standing, before the court enters 
an order tha.t may prejudice the applicant. 
C. Intervention of Right 
The history of intervention of right prior to the amendment of 
Rule 24(a)(2) in 1966 needs only brief examination here.84 In a path-
breaking article published during 1936, Professors Moore and Levi 
identified two classifications of cases in which judges seemed to assume 
that applicants were entitled to intervene, and these categories underlie 
original Rule 24 promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1938. 85 
Paragraph (a)(3) of the Rule mandated intervention when appli-
cants would be affected adversely by the disposition of property within 
a court's control. 86 The Advisory Committee intended that the para-
graph codify existing intervention practice, whereby courts had broadly 
interpreted the idea of property so as to grant intervention liberally.87 
Thus, some judges treating intervention petitions filed after the Rule's 
adoption "virtually disregarded the language of this provision. "88 
Paragraph (a)(2) provided for intervention of right by an applicant 
that might be bound, and whose interests could be represented inad-
83. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); accord Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 
U.S. 605, 612-13 (1989). . 
84. I rely most in this subsection on Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-
Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 894 (1980). See also F. 
JAMES & G. HAZARD, C1v1L PROCEDURE 548-53 (3d ed. 1985); Moore & Levi, Federal 
Intervention I. The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 577-81 (1936). 
85. The first involved cases in which the absentee asserted an interest in property 
the court controlled whose distribution would prejudice the absentee. The second included 
cases in which possible resolution of the original litigants' dispute would bind an absentee's 
later effort to protect its interest which the parties inadequately represented. See Moore & 
Levi, supra note 84, at 581, 582-95; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 24, I F.R.D. xciv-xcv (1938). 
86. "Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action 
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other dis-
position of property in the custody of the court ... . "See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(3), I F.R.D. 
xciv ( 1938). 
87. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, NOTES 25 (Mar. 1938); see also Mis-
souri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1941). 
88. FED. R. C1v. P. 24 advisory committee's note; see also Cohn, The New Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1231 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the 
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 356, 400-02 (1967). 
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equately, ifthe litigation proceeded in its absence.89 Although numer-
ous courts read the "bound" language to mean practical prejudice,90 a 
majority of judges interpreted it in a resjudicata sense.91 The Supreme 
Court, in the 1961 case of Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,92 
subscribed to the res judicata reading, found that application incon-
sistent with the inadequate representation requirement, and rendered 
paragraph (a)(2) a nullity in class actions.93 
This interpretation was the major reason for the amendment of 
Rule 24 in 1966, and it was included in a package of party joinder 
amendments that substantially revised Rules 19, 23 and 24. 94 The Ad-
visory Committee intended that the changes promote more flexible, 
practical judicial application generally and rectify specific difficulties 
federal courts had encountered when interpreting the Rules' terminol-
ogy. The drafters also purportedly meant to include criteria for party 
joinder decisionmaking, not definitional classifications, although they 
apparently failed to execute this intent in writing Rule 24(a)(2).95 
The 1966 amendment of Rule 24 collapsed the .requirements of 
paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) into one provision. Revised paragraph 
{a)(2) states that potential intervenors with an interest in the property 
or transaction that is the subject of the litigation which may suffer 
practical prejudice shall be permitted to intervene, unless existing par-
ties represent them adequately.96 Precisely what the Advisory Com-
mittee intended to achieve with the changes in Rule 24(a)(2) remains 
unclear and controversial. Nonetheless, it is possible to afford an ac-
count of those considerations most relevant to the issues discussed here. 
89. See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2), I F.R.D. xciv (1938). 
90. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir. 
1962); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. (1960), cert. denied, 363 
U.S. 830 (1960); see also Shreve, supra note 84, at 904. 
91. See, e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 21 (1951); see also 
Shreve, supra note 84, at 904. See generally Colin, supra note 88, at 1229 (many courts 
ignored question of adequate representation). 
92. 36.6 U.S. 683 (1961). 
93. Id. at 691-93. 
This holding created a Catch-22 situation with respect to intervention by a class 
member in a pen4ing class action on grounds of inadequate representation: if the 
class member was in fact inadequately represented, the judgment would not bind 
him ... on the other hand, if representation was adequate, there was no ground for 
his intervention. 
United States v. Hooker Chems: & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 982 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(citation omitted). 
94. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 153-
54 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cohn, supra note 88, at 1204, 1230; see also supra note 
39 and accompanying text. · 
95. See Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 
329, 374 (1969); see also Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, 
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 757-62 (1968). 
96. See supra note I. 
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The Committee certainly meant to remedy problems-especially 
rendering paragraph (a)(2) a nullity in class actions-that the Supreme 
Court's interpretation in Sam Fox had created.97 The drafters also 
sought to foster more flexible, pragmatic judicial treatment of inter-
vention of right and its three principal specific requirements-interest, 
impairment and inadequate representation. 98 
Less clear is exactly what the Advisory Committee intended with 
respect to the interest criterion. Some judges, including members of 
the Supreme Court, have maintained that the Committee meant to 
leave the interest idea unchanged. 99 Nevertheless, the drafters seemed 
to contemplate some modification, albeit limited. In 1967, Professor 
Benjamin Kaplan, who had served as the Reporter for the Advisory 
Committee at the time of the Rule's amendment, wrote that the altered 
phraseology was supposed to "drive beyond the narrow notion of an 
interest in specific property [although] interest ... in the new rule finds 
its own limits in the historic continuity of the subject of intervention 
and in the concepts of new Rule 19, to which intervention looks for 
analogy." 100 Moreover, the drafters deleted the requirement that ap-
plicants have an interest in property in the court's custody, perhaps 
evincing cognizance that less tangible interests might suffice; 101 how-
ever, the 1966 version states that applicants must have an interest 
"relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the ac-
tion."102 
Another area of ambiguity involves the question of whether the 
Committee· intended to provide specifically for public law litigation 
when reformulating the provision. Some courts and writers have con-
tended that the drafters revised all three party joinder amendments or 
at least Rule 24 with public law cases in mi~d. 103 Professor Kaplan 
97. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 24, 39 F.R.D. 89, 109 ( 1966); see also 
Kaplan, supra note 88, at 401-02. 
98. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 24, 39 F.R.D. 89, 109 .(1966); see also 
Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 982 n. 13. ··'· 
99. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, (5th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); 
100. Kaplan, supra note 88, at 405. 
IOI. Professor Bandes states that the 1966 amendment abandoned the property re-
strictions "in keeping with the trend toward recognizing less tangible interests." Bandes, supra 
note 11, at 252 n. 164 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-89 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). The 
Court decided those cases, however, a decade after the Advisory Committee had "essentially 
finished writing the party joinder amendments." See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
103. See, e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 710 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th Cir. 1983); Chayes, 
supra note 13, at 1292. 
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alluded, although obliquely, to this possibility in 1968, by observing 
that the amendment of Rule 23 was meant to foster more vigorous 
invocation of the class action device as a mechanism for vindicating 
the interests of large numbers of people who individually would be 
unable to litigate. 104 
Certain judges and commentators, however, have asserted that the 
Advisory Committee drafted the three party joinderamendments prin-
cipally for private law suits. 105 Professor Arthur Miller, another former 
Reporter, has argued persuasively that the importance of Rule 23's 
revision to public law litigation and to the "litigation explosion" has 
been overstated. 106 He also has observed that the Committee had es-
sentially finished writing the party joinder amendments in 1962-prior 
to the substantial expansion of public law litigation, Congressional pas-
sage of much "social" legislation, and the relatively widespread rec-
ognition of new ways of conceptualizing the "interest" idea, such as 
liberalization of standing discussed above. 107 In short, the drafters prob-
ably did not specifically anticipate or expressly provide in Rule 24(a)(2) 
for public law litigation in a number of the forms it presently as-
sumes.108 
Courts and writers have criticized the amendment of Rule 24(a)(2) 
and its quartercentury of judicial application. Shortly after the Com-
mittee revised the provision in 1966, two respected scholars claimed 
that Rule 24(a)(2) was flawed in the amendment process. 109 Professor 
John Kennedy observed that the drafters had not followed through on 
their commitment to provide decisional criteria, rather than defini-
tional categories, in the party joinder amendments, leaving the revision 
incomplete. 110 Professor David Shapiro, essentially concurring in that 
assessment, suggested numerous relevant criteria to fill this gap and 
recommended that the Advisory Committee combine intervention of 
right and permissive intervention under Rule 24 (b ). 111 Professor 
104. See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, IO B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1968). 
In 1989, he observed that "there was a sense in which the. amended rule was not neutral: it 
did not escape attention at the time that it would open the way to the assertion of many, 
many claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in the throats of 
establishment defendants." Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2126-
27 (1989). 
105. See, e.g., Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 983-84; Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 
700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Note, Intervention in Government Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174 
(1976). 
106. See Miller, supra note 40, at 664-76. 
107. See id. at 670 n. 31. See generally supra notes 4-5, 9-20, 102 and accompanying 
text. But see supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
I 08. This is particularly true of institutional reform litigation. See supra notes 15-16 
and accompanying text. See generally supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
I 09. See Kennedy, supra note 95; Shapiro, supra note 95. 
110. See Kennedy, supra note 95, at 374-75. 
111. See Shapiro, supra note 95, at 757-64. 
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Emma Coleman Jordan and Professor Gene Shreve subsequently iden-
tified inconsistencies in the judicial application of intervention and 
waste of judicial resources in intervention decisionmaking, especially 
concerning appeals. 112 The commentators made suggestions similar to 
those of Professors Kennedy and Shapiro, such as recommending that 
all non-statutory intervention of right decisionmaking be committed 
to trial court discretion. 113 The next part analyzes judicial application 
of Rule 24(a)(2) over the last twenty-five years. 
lII. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF RULE 24(A)(2) 
Fe4eral judges have encountered many problems delineating pre-
cisely what applicants must show to intervene of right. The compli-
cations entailed in treating the interest requirement, however, are par-
adigmatic and most important to standing's relevance to the question 
of intervention of right. 114 The interest requirement, th.erefore, will be 
the focus of this part, while the remaining three requirements-im-
pairment, inadequate representations and timeliness-will be examined. 
when relevant. 
Numerous courts and commentators have recognized that the fed-
eral judiciary has experienced considerable difficulty in defining the 
interest necessary to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2) since the time of its 1966 
amendment. 115 Some have observed that an authoritative definition 
has yet to be enunciated, 116 while others have considered futile attempts 
to elaborate the interest idea. 117 
The Supreme Court has rarely a<,idressed Rule 24(a)(2}, and when 
it has, the opinions have been.peculiarly fact-bound, affording minimal 
guidance, especially as to the meaning of interest. 118 In the 1967 case 
112. See Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Af 
firm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 47, 55-62, 69-70 (1979) (inconsistent 
judicial application); Shreve, supra note 84, at 921-24 (waste of judicial resources) .. 
113. See Jones, supra note 112, at 62-78, 83-86 (suggesting flexible application so-
licitous of civil rights litigants); Shreve, supra note 84, at 924-27 (suggesting commitment to 
trial court discretion). 
114. Interest is part of the impairment and inadequate representation requirements 
and implicates timeliness, while judicial application of interest is typical of the other three 
criteria. Moreover, judicial invocation of standing implicates the interest condition much 
more than the remaining requirements. 
115. See, e.g., Independent Petrochemical v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 105 F.R.D. 
106, 109-10 (D.D.C. 1985); 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1908, at 263-88 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE]. 
116. See, e.g., Panola Land Buying Co. v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1523 (I Ith Cir. 1988) 
(Clark, J., dissenting); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
117. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf Washington State 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (example ofNinth Circuit opinions that apparently ignore interest 
requirement). 
118. See Panola, 844 F.2d at 1523; Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th 
Cir. 1987); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1908, at 265-66, 270. 
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of Cascade Natural Gas. Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 119 the Court 
read the Rule broadly and granted intervention of right, implying that 
a particular equitable or legal interest is unnecessary to satisfy the 
Rule. 120 Judges and writers have ascribed the Court's determination to 
its "splenetic displeasure" with the federal govern~ent's handling of 
the natural gas antitrust case and to the Court's desire to facilitate the 
vindication of substantive rights considered to have national conse-
quence by potential intervenors which included the State of California 
and companies that were dependent on competition. 121 
The Court interpreted Rule 24(a){2) narrowly by requiring that an 
applicant have a "significantly protectable" interest in the 1971 opinion, 
Donaldson v. United States. 122 Courts and comm~ntators have ob-
s{'.rved, however, that the quoted language has "not been a term of art 
iri the law of intervention and provides "little more guidance than does 
the bare term 'interest'" in the Rule while stating that. ~here is consid-
erable disagreement about its meaning. 123 Some writers also have crit-
icized the Court's interpretation of the Rule, principc;tllY because it was 
allegedly manipulating procedure to protect the government's substan-
tive interest in effective enforcement of the tax statutcs. 124 
In the 1972 decision Trbovich v. United States, 125 the Supreme 
Court found that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
did not proscnbe union members' intervention in litigation that the 
Secretary of Labor commenced in an effort to set aside the election of 
officers of th~ union. 126 The Court seemed to imply that intervention 
applicants need not have standing and explicitly recognized the "dis-
tinction between intervention and initiation," 127 but the Court limited 
the intervention granted and the opinion probably s6ould be restricted 
to its facts and the peculiar statutory scheme invol~ed. 128 
119. 386 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1967). 
120. Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 110 n. 8 (Court implicitly rejected 
specific interest); accord Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bakker, 132 F.R.D. 155, 157 
(W.D.N.C. 1990). 
121. See Smuck, 408 F;2d at 179 n. 16; accord Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 986 n. 
15. Cf. Shreve, supra note 84, at 923 n. 124 (Court's desire to facilitate intervenor's vindication 
of rights); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1908, at 264-68 (helpful analysis of case). 
122. 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). 
123. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1908, at 270; accord Purnell v. City of 
Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 947 (6th Cir. 1991); Panola, 844 F.2d at 1521. 
124. See, e.g., Shreve, supra note 84, at 924 n. 125; FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 
115, § 1908, at 270. The Court held that a taxpayer could not intervene of right in a summary 
proceeding by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a third party's compliance with the 
Service's subpoena seeking records that implicated the taxpayer's tax liabilities. See Donald-
son, 400 U.S. at 528-30. 
125. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). 
126. The Court so held, even· though the statute expressly barred union members 
from initiating suit. Id. at 531. 
127. See id. at 536. 
128. See id. at 536-37. The Court restricted intervention to the claims of illegality 
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The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that some lower fed-
eral courts were invoking standing in their intervention of right deci-
sionmaking and that others were not in the 1986 determination in 
Diamond v. Char/es. 129 A majority of the Court specifically refrained 
from deciding whether potential intervenors "must satisfy not only the 
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Article Ill," 
while holding that "an intervenor's right to continue a suit in the ab-
sence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contin-
gent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements 
of Art. 111."130 Three concurring justices observed, however, that the 
1966 amendment did not change the provision's interest criterion, 
claiming that Rule 24(a)(2)'s " 'requirement of a significantly protect-
able interest' calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded 
some degree of legal protection." 131 
This relative dearth of Supreme Court precedent and its fact-in-
tensive nature have meant that the lower federal courts have assumed 
primary responsibility for articulating the interest requirement and for 
applying Rule 24(a)(2). Circuit and district judges have exhibited great 
difficulty defining interest with sufficient clarity, despite the thousands 
of opportunities available to them. Indeed, Professor Susan Bandes 
recently identified some half-dozen formulations of the interest re-
quirement, several of which are defined inconsistently, a finding my 
research essentially confirms. 132 
Judicial articulation of the interest requirement ranges across a 
broad spectrum. At one end, there is a cluster of ideas that may fairly 
included in the Secretary's complaint. Id. at 537. Courts rely on Trbovich today mostly for 
its articulation of the adequate representation requirement: the condition "is satisfied if the 
applicant shows that representation of his interest 'may be' inadequate; and the burden of 
making that showing should be treated as minimal." Id. at 538 n.10 (citation omitted). 
129. 476 U.S. 54, 68 n.21 (1986). For a description of the facts in Diamond and an 
explanation of how a district court should have resolved Dr. Diamond's request to intervene 
of right, see infra notes 211-24 and accompanying' text. 
130. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68. For recent lower court opinions following Diamond, 
see United States v. Western Electric Co., 900 F.2d 283, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Eubanks v. 
Wilkinson, 891 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1989). See generally infra note 167 and accompanying 
text. 
131. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court has ad-
dressed Rule 24(aX2) in additional opinions. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 367-68 (1980), 
may be read as an implicit rejection of the requirement that applicants must have standing. 
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987), principally treats the 
appealability of district court intervention decisionmaking. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
( 1989), requires that plaintiffs join under Rule 19 absentees who might be adversely affected 
by entry of a consent decree in Title VII litigation, rather than demanding that the absentees 
seek to intervene under Rule 24. 
132. See Bandes, supra note 11, at 251. My research includes earlier analyses of 
broader application of Rule 24(a)(2) in ways that disadvantaged public interest litigants and 
of intervention in abortion litigation. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 322-29; Tobias, Intervention 
After Webster, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 731 (1990). It also includes analysis of all opinions 
mentioning standing-research undertaken for this piece. My conclusion is that Professor 
Bandes may have underestimated the number of formulations and the degree of inconsistency. 
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be characterized as flexible or even open-textured; the principal pro-
ponents of these views have been judges in the United States Courts 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits. 133 A few 
of these judges effectively read the interest idea out of Rule 24(a)(2) or 
even ignore it. 134 Most of the courts, however, expend little energy 
attempting to extract meaning from the term interest. Rather, they 
examine the pragmatic implications of denying intervention and the 
policies underlying the 1966 amendment, occasionally stating that the 
Advisory Committee meant to liberalize intervention of right. 135 In-
sofar as the courts rely on any definition of interest, they subscribe to 
Judge Harold Leventhal's 1967 enunciation: "the 'interest' test is pri-
marily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many 
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due 
process." 136 A number of these judges concomitantly consider interest 
a threshold requirement, finding Rule 24(a)(2)'s impairment and in-
adequate representation criteria preferable mechanisms for resolving 
intervention controversies. 137 Moreover, many of the courts expressly 
reject the notions that interest means a specific equitable or legal 
interest 138 or connotes a "direct, substantial, legally protectable interest 
in the proceedings." 139 
These formulations-especially ones cast. in terms substantially 
similar to the latter articulation in the sentence above-are employed 
by many judges, principally in the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, 
whose treatment of the interest requirement lies at the more restrictive 
end of the spectrum. 140 Numerous courts apply tests that are equally, 
133. See, e.g., Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700; Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 
109-10; see also Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 824-25 (5th Cir . 
. 1967). 
134. See, e.g., Spellman, 684 F.2d at 629-30; Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
135. See, e.g., Smuck, 408 F.2d at 177-78; cf Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians 
v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 
637 (9th Cir. 1988). . 
136. Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700; accord Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 
302, 308 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 729 (4th Cir. 1986); Sanguine, 
Ltd. v. United States Dep't oflnterior, 798 F.2d 389, 392 (10th Cir. 1986);Atlantis, 379 F.2d 
m~~ , 
137. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Smuck, 
408 F.2d at 179; United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 418-20 (D. Minn. 
1972). 
138. See, e.g., Cascade Nat. Gas Corp., 386 U.S. at 132-36; Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700; 
Smuck, 408 F.2d at 178-80; Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 110 n. 8; Employers 
Reinsurance Corp. v. Bakker, 132 F.R.D. 155, 157 (W.D.N.C. 1990). 
139. See, e.g., Independent Petrochemical, 105 F.R.D. at 109~10. For cases that sub-
scribe to the articulation, see Manasota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318, 1322 (I Ith Cir. 
1990); American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 145, 146 (7th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 754 F.Supp. 935, 939 (D. Mass. 1991). 
140. Professor Bandes nicely captures the permutations and combinations with ci-
tations to relevant cases. See Bandes, supra note 11, at 251. 
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if not more, stringent, demanding that applicants be real parties in 
interest or be able to state a claim for relief. 141 
In short, the lower federal courts have had primary responsibility 
for applying the interest condition since the 1966 revision . of Rule 
24(a)(2). One salient feature of the several thousand intervention opin-
ions that these judges issued between 1966 and 1980 was that almost 
none required applicants to have standing. 142 Nevertheless, since 1980 
an increasing number of judges has demanded that potential interven-
ors possess something greater than, or equal to, standing or satisfy 
certain constituents of the standing inquiry. The Supreme Court re-
cently acknowledged that lower federal courts were invoking standing 
in their intervention determinations but refused to address the pro-
priety of that practice. 143 Since 1986, numerous judges have relied on 
standing to resolve intervention requests, some have rejected its appl-
icability, and the vast majority has not mentioned standing in ruling 
on intervention motions. The invocation of standing has created con-
flicts within the federal judiciary while imposing uncertainty and hard-
ship on litigants and applicants. These difficulties will worsen, until the 
Supreme Court resolves the relevance of standing to intervention of 
right. The next section considers the cases which have said or indicated 
that standing implicates the Rule 24(a)(2) inquiry. 
IV. APPLICATION OF STANDING TO INTERVENTION OF RIGHT 
A. Standing as Relevant to Intervention of Right 
Many circuit and district court judges with differing degrees of 
explicitness have stated how standing implicates the intervention of 
right inquiry. Moreover, a significant number has subscribed to differ-
ent combinations of the formulations, adopting, for example, certain 
constituents of the constitutional requirements or various aspects of 
the prudential limitations. 
141. See, e.g., Worlds v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitation Servs., 929 F.2d 591, 
594 (I Ith Cir. 1991) (real party in interest); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe 
Line, 732 F.2d 452, 463-65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (state claim for 
relief); cf Manasota, 896 F.2d at 1321 (substantial, legally protectable interest and real party 
in interest). . 
142. A few courts mentioned standing, but virtually none required that applicants 
possess standing. See, e.g., Du Pree v. United States, 559 F.2d 11 SI, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1977); 
lllinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1977); Providence Journal v. F.B.l., 460 F. 
Supp. 762, 766 (D.R.I. 1978); Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, 59 F.R.D. 316, 321 (S.D. 
Fla. 1973); United States v. Int'! Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (D. Conn. 1972). 
Of course, some of these cases involved private law litigation in which standing has consid-
erably less relevance. 
143. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986). 
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Several courts have expressly demanded that intervention appli-
cants possess something more substantial than standing. One of the 
most specific articulations appears in the 1985 Seventh Circuit opinion, 
United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land. 144 In that case, Congress had 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to condemn a power company's 
real property for inclusion in a National Lakeshore. 145 The Seventh 
Circuit upheld the trial judge's rejection of an intervehtion request filed 
by a public interest litigant whose members had lobbied Congress to 
create the Lakeshore, had used it for recreation, and had sought to 
challenge the Department's tepid commitment to condemnation. 146 
The circuit court stated that the interest of an inte~ention applicant 
"must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing re-
quirement." 147 The panel found a "qualitative difference between ... 
the 'direct, significant legally protectable interest' required to intervene 
in a condemnation action [and] the 'interest' which is sufficient for 
standing to bring an action under the APA," because the latter interest 
only must be one that is arguably within the zone of interest protected 
by applicable legislation. 148 
Numerous courts have demanded that applicants possess an in-
terest equivalent to standing. One prominent example is the 1984 opin-
ion of the District of Columbia Circuit in Southern Christian Lead-
·ership Conference v. Kelley. 149 Kelley involved Senator Jesse Helms' 
attempt to intervene of right in litigation over electronic surveillance 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
The Senator reportedly sought to participate so that he could cast an 
informed vote on the proposal to establish a national holiday honoring 
Dr. King. 150 The court affirmed the district judge's denial of the inter-
vention motion, "because the movant lack[ed] a protectable interest 
sufficient to confer standing." 151 The Kelley court observed that Rule 
24(a)(2) implicitly refers to a legally protectable interest, remarking that 
"such a gloss upon the rule is in any case required by Article III of the 
Constitution."152 Judges in, or on, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted similar formulations, stating, for example, that the "would-be 
144. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986). 
145. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 859; see also Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460u to 460u-23 ( 1982). 
146. See 36.96Acres, 754 F.2d at 858-60. 
147. Id. at 859; accord Lac Courte Oreilles Band oflndians v. Wisconsin, 116 F.R.D. 
608, 610-11 (W.D. Wis. 1987). 
148. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 859. The panel's allusions to standing are premised 
on Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 ( 1972), which the applicants .claimed should support 
their intervention. 
149. 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
150. Id. at 778. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 779. 
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intervenor must demonstrate at least the interest required to assert 
standing to initiate a lawsuit" 153 or must possess an interest identical 
to that of parties. 154 
Many courts have invoked particular standing requirements ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court. Some judges, for instance, apparently 
adverting to prudential limitations on standing, have demanded that 
applicants assert their own rights, not those of third parties, that po-
tential intervenors have a "particularized interest rather than a gen-
eralized grievance," or that their claims be closely related to the interests 
that relevant legislation is intended to protect. 155 A few courts, seem-
ingly drawing on the constitutional component of standing doctrine, 
have insisted that applicants' injuries be fairly traceable to defendants' 
allegedly unlawful conduct or that there be a substantial likelihood that 
a favorable judgment will redress the harm. 156 
Additional courts when resolving intervention requests or consid-
ering the Rule's four specific requirements, especially the interest cri-
terion, have mentioned standing, have imposed on applicants require-
ments which are functional equivalents of standing, or have otherwise 
indicated that standing somehow implicates Rule 24(a)(2). 157 A number 
of these judicial determinations are unclear, with numerous courts 
seemingly employing standing in a "loose" or colloquial sense of being 
heard to made an assertion, including the idea of a right to, an interest 
in, or an entitlement to, a claim. 158 
153. See Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 9-56, 962 n. l (I Ith Cir. 1986) (Clark, J., 
dissenting); see also Gautreaux v. Kemp, 132 F.R.D. 193, J 95 (N.D. IJJ. 1990). 
154. See Panola Land Buying Ass'n v, Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988); 
see also Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 ( 1985); 
New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464-65 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
155. Examples of cases involving third party standing are Panola, 844 F.2d at 1509 
and Santiago Collazo v. Franqui Acosta, 721 F. Supp. 385, 388-89 (D.P.R. 1989). Examples 
of cases involving a generalized grievance are Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212 
(11th Cir. 1989) and Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 602 (3d Cir. 1987). Examples of cases 
involving claims related to statutory·interests are Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 
F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) and Avery v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Mass. 1984). 
156. Examples of courts requiring causation are League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1989) and Avery, 584 F. Supp. at 316. Cf 
Santiago Collazo, 721 F. Supp. at 389-90 (redressability). 
157. These courts principally are in the Fifth~ Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. Recent 
opinions from these circuits which include most of the relevant case law are Clements, 884 
F.2d 185; American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1989) 
and Manasota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318, 1321 (I I th Cir. 1990). See also supra notes 
139-41 and accompanying text. 
158. Even judges who otherwise champion quite flexible, pragmatic application of 
Rule 24(a)(2) speak of"standing to intervene." See, e.g .. 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 860, 861 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1967). These 
judges seem to be using standing in this loose or colloquial sense, as do the authors of most 
opinions not already mentioned in this subsection. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 
1717, 1722 (1990); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980); United States v. Yonkers 
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Nearly all of the judges who make standing relevant to the inter-
vention of right inquiry offer little, if any, explanation for such treat-
ment. Nonetheless, a few courts have been relatively forthcoming. For 
instance, one provided that standing case law helps to "define the type 
of interest that the intervenor must assert," perhaps evincing appre-
ciation of how standing should be considered relevant to Rule 
24(a)(2). 159 That court and others specifically differentiate standing to 
initiate litigation from what applicants must show to intervene of right 
in ongoing lawsuits, apparently recognizing that these are discrete in-
quiries.160 
Notwithstanding this relative lack of justification for invoking 
standing, some plausible, if not compelling, reasons for doing so can 
be posited. After all, standing and intervention of right are not com-
pletely unrelated ideas: both concepts implicate what courts require of 
entities that wish to participate in litigation. Concomitantly, certain 
policies that underlie standing are very important to Rule 24(a)(2), as 
will be seen below, 161 andjudges may have been so applying standing, 
although their opinions do not leave that impression. 
Standing also might have seemed to afford a convenient solution 
for problems that the 1966 amendment created or left unresolved or 
for difficulties that have arisen in the federal courts during the last 
quarter century, such as the litigation explosion. For example, judges 
Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Napper, 887 F.2d 1528, 
1533 (11th Cir. 1989) (Johnson, J., concurring specially); N.Y. State Nat'! Org. for Women 
v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1349 (2d Cir. 1989); Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d I 000, 1004 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Eng v. Coughlin, 865 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1989) (Mahoney, J., concurring); 
Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Boorstin, 763 
F.2d 1462, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hickey v. NCNB 
Texas Nat'! Bank, 763 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Tex. 1991). There also is a line of cases, typified 
by Panola, that speaks of a lawyer's "standing to intervene" to recover an attorney's fee. For 
helpful treatment of this narrow problem, see Note, Fee As the Wind Blows: Waivers of 
Attorneys Fees in Individual Civil Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1278, 1282-91 (1989). Other cases not examined or treated tersely above which mention 
standing are: Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir., 1989) (generalized interest); 
Portland Audubon Soc'y, 866 F.2d at 308 n.I (standing requirement implicitly addressed by 
interest requirement); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464 
(5th Cir. 1984) (third party standing); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849, 851 
(10th Cir. I 981)(generalized interest); Allard v. Frizzel, 536 F.2d 1332, 1334 (10th Cir. 1976) 
(same); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Indians v. Wisconsin, 116 F.R.D. 608, 610 (W.D. Wis. 
1987) (generalized interest). The cases treated to this point in the Article are not an exhaustive 
compilation but include most of .the major cases. 
159. See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. Of course, many of the cases treated above ap-
parently apply the standing case law in that way. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., 732 F.2d 
at 464-65; Santiago Collazo, 721 F. Supp. at 388-89; cf infra notes 196-97 (how standing 
should be considered relevant to Rule 24(a)(2)). 
160. See, e.g., Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212-13; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 
n. I (11th Cir. 1986) (Clark, J., dissenting); see also supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
161. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. 
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concerned about the increasingly unwieldy party structure of cases may 
have found standing an efficacious basis for excluding intervention 
applicants that would expand the number of litigants in a lawsuit. 162 
Mariy courts apparently have employed standing to deny inter-
vention by applicants that looked like intermeddlers or which asserted 
interests that the jµdges might have considered intangible, tenuous or 
indirectly related to the litigation's subject matter, particularly as com-
pared with more traditional interests. 163 Numerous courts also seem 
to have substituted standing for one of Rule 24(a)(2)'s specific criteria, 
namely interest or inadequate representation. 164 Furthermore, most 
judges who invoked standing may well have correctly resolved the 
intervention of right inquiry, although this is unremarkable. Courts 
have a number of means of treating intervention requests, especially 
in ways that reject them, such as by demanding that applicants fully 
satisfy all four Rule requirements or imposing strict burdens of proof 
on them. 165 
162. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (cases involving hundreds of parties); 
Resnik, supra note 21, at 502 n. 30 ("Calder-like configurations we call 'cases' today"). Stand-
ing also might seem to be an effective mechanism for limiting what som!! judges may perceive 
as open-ended intervention made possible by the "liberalizing" 1966 amendment. See supra 
note 77 and accompanying text. 
163. Examples of applicants that courts might have viewed as intermeddlers were 
Dr. Diamond in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), and Senator Helms in Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984). These, and other, 
intervention denials also may have been motivated by political considerations, which some 
may consider appropriate, depending.on their political perspectives. For example, excluding 
Diamond or the Illinois Right to Life Coalition from Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th 
Cir. 1985), would enable pro-choice plaintiffs to pursue their claims to reproductive rights 
free from the substantial costs that some intervenors have imposed in abortion litigation. 
See Tobias, supra note 132. Of course, this does not exactly yield "neutral principles" of 
application. Correspondingly, some courts have excluded industry applicants from litigation 
brought by public interest litigants. See, e.g., Manasota-88, 896 F.2d 1318; Portland Audubon 
Soc'y, 866 F.2d 302. See also United States v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 922 F.2d 
704 (I Ith Cir. 1991). In fairness, some applicants have appeared "one step removed" from 
the litigation. See Chayes, supra note 13, at 1292. That does not necessarily mean that they 
should be barred from intervening. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text. 
164. See, e.g., 39.36 Acres and Kelley, discussed supra notes 144-52 and accompanying 
text. Indeed, many courts link standing to interest and inadequate representation, often seem-
ing to employ the following colloquial formulation: an applicant has no standing to complain 
that its interests are being prejudiced when it is adequately represented, especially by the 
government. The majority and concurring opinions iil Diamond, 476 U.S. 54, 7f (O'Connor, 
J., concurring), convey that impression. See also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 902 
F.2d 213, 217-19 (2d Cir. 1990). These uses of standing, especially to amend Rule 24(a)(2) 
informally or as a surrogate for other components of the Rule, although perhaps understand-
able, are inadvisable. They essentially substitute a rather crude instrument for more appro-
priate ones, although I may be vulnerable to similar crititisms in my formulation of a pref-
erable approach to intervention of right. See infra notes 196-257 and accompanying text. 
165. See, e.g., Manasota-88, 896 F.2d at 1321-23; Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268-71. 
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B. Standing as Irrelevant 
This is not to say that clearer explanations have been provided by 
the vast majority of judges who have failed to mention standing in 
their intervention decisionmaking and the small 'number stating that 
standing should have limited or no relevance. Of course, judges writing 
the thousands of opinions that omit any reference to standing offer 
little justification for their silence, and that silence does not necessarily 
mean that the courts found standing irrelevant or even considered the 
issue. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of cases that do not allude to 
standing may testify to the minimal relevance that standing should 
receive, while silence in many of the opinions could fairly be interpreted 
as indicating judges' belief that standing was irrelevant. 
The relatively few courts that have explicitly found standing ir-
relevant or of limited relevance to intervention have been no more 
expansive than judges who invoke standing. Trbovich, discussed earlier, 
could be read as an implicit rejection by the Supreme Court of the 
application of standing to intervention of right, and an analogous al-
lusion appears in the Court's 1980 decision, Bryant v. Yellen. 166 Sim-
ilarly, in Diamond, the m(:\jority's phrasing of the relevant question as 
whether applicants "must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Article III," and its observation 
that Dr. Diamond might have relied on the state's standing, had Illinois 
chosen to appeal, could be endorsements of intervention at the trial 
court level by entities without standing. 167 Nonetheless, the Court's 
express reservation for future decision of the standing question in Dia-
mond probably should be interpreted as the most recent indication of 
the Court's belief that it has yet to resolve the issue. 168 
Lower federal court treatment also has been comparatively terse. 
Some judges have asserted that an "intervenor need not have the stand-
ing necessary to initiate the lawsuit" 169 or that the "intervention re-
166 .. 447 U.S. 35i (1980); see also supra note 127 and accom'!anying text; supra note 
131. 
167. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64, 68-69; see also Bandes, supra note 11, at 254; 
Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. M1cH. J.L.REF. 647, 661-62, 
668 (1988). ' ' 
168. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68-69; cf Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 
1724 ( 1990) (characterizing Court's rejection in Diamond of physician's attempt to defend 
state law restricting abortions because fewer abortions would lead to more paying patients 
on basis that" 'unadon~ed speculation' insufficient to invoke the federal judicial power"). 
169. Indian River Recovery Co. v. The China, 108 F.R.D. 383, 386 (D. Del. 1985); 
Avery v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 312, 316 n. 3 (D. Mass. 1984); accord Purnell v. City of 
Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 1991); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1979); 
USPS v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Imperial Irrigation 
Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 521 (9th Cir. 1977); Evans v. Buchanan, 130 F.R. D. 306, 310 n. 5 (D. 
Del. 1990). . 
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quirements are more liberal than those for standing."170 These courts 
have provided little substantiation for their pronouncements, often cit-
ing only to case precedent. 171 Panels of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
recently refused to require that potential intervenors demonstrate 
standing, although both courts stated that standing implicates Rule 
24(a)(2). 172 
Judges from the Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits and 
elsewhere have recognized or emphasized the difference between what 
entities must show to institute federal court litigation and to intervene 
of right in an ongoing case. 173 For example, Judge David Bazelon, 
writing for the District of Columbia Circuit, stated that "in the context 
of intervention the question is not whether a lawsuit should be begun, 
but whether already initiated litigation should be extended to include 
additional parties." 174 Concomitantly, the judges have partially prem-
ised their determinations that intervention applicants need not have 
standing on the existence of a case or controversy between the plaintiffs 
and the defendants. 175 
Despite the rather limited judicial treatment, there is considerable 
support for the courts' refusal to invoke standing to deny intervention. 
The history and judicial application of standing and intervention of 
right show that they had different origins and were intended to serve 
dissimilar, albeit not totally distinct, purposes. 176 As discussed earlier, 
standing involves certain constitutional and prudential requirements 
that courts impose on those wishing to commence suit.· Intervention 
of right involves what judges demand of entities seeking to join liti-
gation already initiated, before the court makes a substantive decision 
170. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 861 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); United States v. Bd. 
of School Comm'rs, 446 F.2d 573, 577, (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973). 
See generally supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
171. Purnell, 925 F.2d at 948; Wynn, 599 F.2d at 196; USPS, 579 F.2d at 190; Imperial 
Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d at 521; Evans, 130 F.R.D. at 310 n. 5; Indian River Recovery Co., 
i08 F.R.D. at 386; Avery, 584 F. Supp. at 316 n. 3. 
i 72. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 n. i (9th Cir. 1989); 
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 12 i2-i3 (11th Cir. i 989). 
173. See supra note 160. indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged the "distinction 
between intervention and initiation" in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 
536 n. 7 (1972). Cf United States v. $129,374 in United States Currency, 769 F.2d 583,586 
(9th Cir. 1985) (district court erroneously confused standing and Rule 24's intervention 
requirements). 
i 74. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969); accord Wade v. Gold-
schmidt, 673 F.2d i82, 184 (7th Cir. 1982); independent Petrochemical Co. v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., 105 F.R.D. 106, 110 (D.D.C. 1985). 
175. See, e.g., Chiles, 865 F.2d at i2i2-i3; Brennan, 579 F.2d at i90; New York 
State Energy Research & Dev. Auth. v. Nuclear Fuel Servs., 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d i377, i378 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
176. See supra notes 44-1 i3 and accompanying text. 
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that might adversely affect the applicants. Numerous courts and com-
mentators have convincingly contended that there is little, if any, reason 
to demand standing ofan absentee in this situation, because the plaintiff 
has satisfied the case or controversy requirement, the judicial machin-
ery has been mobilized, and the applicant should be permitted to have 
its say prior to entry of a potentially prejudicial order. 177 Neither the 
phrasing of Rule 24(a)(2) nor its underlying policies support imposition 
of the standing requirements. Moreover, the application of standing is 
inadvisable for numerous policy reasons. For instance, the desirability 
of full and fair public access to the federal courts, the judiciary's need 
for the experience, data, viewpoints and arguments that will enable it 
to reach the best determinations, and considerations of judicial econ-
omy strongly argue against invoking standing as courts have. 
Many of these ideas and others apply with special force when 
public interest litigants seek to intervene in public law litigation, es-
pecially institutional reform cases. 178 Much of this litigation will present 
complex questions of law, implicating constitutional and statutory in-
terpretation; complicated issues of fact, relating to technology, science 
and economics; and difficult problems of policy, involving management 
of large ·bureaucracies and trade-offs among competing interests for 
scarce societal resources. 179 Moreover, the governmental or private ac-
tivity at issue and the judicial decision responding to it often will be 
controversial and will have unclear impacts that affect large numbers 
of people, many of whom will not be parties to the litigation. 180 In 
these situations, judges, who are generalists, will need a broad range of 
expertise, information and perspectives to render the most accurate 
determinations. 181 These factors are peculiarly applicable to institu-
177. See, e.g., Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212-13; Smuck, 408 F.2d at 178; Shapiro, supra 
note 95, at 726. Several sharply divided opinions could be read to suggest that the Supreme 
Court may be unwilling to expand the size of a suit, a part of which will continue because 
it meets Article Ill. Different majorities of the Court apparently bClieve that the new part 
needs an independent justification, although it satisfies the Federal Rules. See Finley v. United 
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); 
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I ( 1976). These cases indicate that some justices may view 
certain of the propositions differently. However, the Court has not applied the differing 
approach above to the precise concepts treated here. Moreover, Congress recently altered 
Finley. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5113 
(1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)). 
178. I rely most here on Tobias, supra note 4, at 279-83, 328-29. 
179. See id. at 279-83; supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. 
180. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 473-
75 (5th Cir. 1984) (Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe 
Line, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984). See Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Com-
mentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REv. 244 (1977) (valuable description 
of these phenomena in the concrete context of a real dispute); cf. Rhode, Class Conflicts in 
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982) (problems of representation). 
181. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1272 (7th Cir., 1985) (Cudahy, J., 
444 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
tional reform litigation, particularly during its remedial phase, when 
courts are attempting to formulate workable structural decrees that will 
improve the functioning of substantial governmental entities and which 
will affect many individuals and institutions. 182 The judges must have 
the views of those intimately familiar with the bureaucracies, persons 
whose cooperation probably will be essential to the efficacious imple-
mentation of any order entered. 183 In institutional reform, and much 
additional public law, litigation, citizen participation in the. form of 
intervention might promote governmental accountability for its 
decisionmaking184 and could make both the governmental decision and 
the judicial determination more palatable to those who must live with 
them. 185 Involvement in litigation also can foster a sense of community 
and may have certain intrinsic value, 186 and permitting that partici-
pation can manifest the judicial system's respect for the worth of per-
sons. 181 
In short, numerous federal circuit and district judges have made 
standing important to their enforcement of Rule 24(a)(2). Most of the 
ways that courts have applied standing in resolving intervention re-
quests have been unnecessary, if not improper, causing confusion and 
hardship, especially for public interest litigants. The next section, there-
fore, offers suggestions for future treatment of standing and of inter-
vention of right. 
dissenting); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Co., 749 F.2d 968, 990 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Moreover, governmental litigants have "no monopoly on what constitutes the public interest 
or on how to represent it most effectively in specific contexts." Tobias, supra note 4, at 329. 
For a compelling example of these phenomena, see 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 861 (Cudahy, 
J., dissenting). 
182. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990). See also Yeazell, 
supra note 180. 
183. See Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Pr<>-
cess, 91 YALE L.J. 1474 (1982). See also Thornburg, Litigating the Zero Sum Game: The 
Effect of Institutional Reform Litigation on Absent Parties, 66 OR. L. REv. 843, 877-79 (I 987). 
184. See. e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 
1986) (National Park Service admitted violating own regulations and National Environmental 
Policy Act when it allowed mining in Alaska's national parks). 
185. For more discussion of public ·acceptability .of and accountability for govern-
mental decisions, see Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation 
in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1973); Furrow, Governing Science: Public 
Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1422-24 (1983). 
186. For discussion of community, see Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Sunstein, Participation, Public 
Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 976, 995 n.88 (1982); cf Mashaw, Administrative 
Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885, 902-04 (1981) (intrinsic 
value). . 
187. Many commentators have expressed this idea. A prominent example is R. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 ( 1979). For research that explores the meaning 
of, and values intrinsic to, participation in modern.courtroom processes, see Burbank, supra 
note 40, at 1466-71; Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right 
to Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153. 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introductory Consideration of Standing 
As discussed above, the federal judiciary's invocation of standing 
to resolve intervention of right' requests has been inadvisable. De-
manding that potential intervenors possess standing and substituting 
standing or certain of its elements for the interest or other Rule 24(a)(2) 
criteria have been unwarranted in nearly all situations. Applicants 
should be required to have standing or to comply with some standing 
component in very few circumstances. One clear instance in which 
standing would be appropriately invoked is the peculiar factual context 
· presented by Diamond v. Charles. The Supreme Court instructed that, 
when neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in the court below chooses 
to appeal to the Supreme Court, an intervenor in the lower court must 
have standing to continue the lawsuit. 188 This determination did not 
mean, however, that the intervenor must have satisfied standing to 
intervene of right at the district court level. 189 
Another situation that might require standing is when an applicant 
wants to vindicate claims that the plaintiff and the defendant do not 
assert. Some courts apparently invoke standing to deny intervention 
in this context, 190 although a few judges and commentators have stated 
that an applicant satisfying the criteria of Rule 24(2)(a) should be per-
mitted to intervene and pursue its claims. 191 Corre~pondingly, public 
interest litigants typically seek relief similar to the party on whose side 
they wish to intervene. Even when public interest litigants request dif-
ferent relief at the remedial stage, they probably 4o not need standing, 
because the court has made the liability determination and needs all 
the relevant input it can secure to fashion efficacious relief. 192 
188. See Diamond v. Charles, 4 76 U.S. 54, 68-69 ( 1986). 
189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
190. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989). See 
generally Washington Elec. Coop. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 
92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 433-34 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185-89 (7th Cir. 1982)~ 
191. See, e.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 
827 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376·U.S. 944 (1964); FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1921, 
at 492-502. But see N.Y. Central R. Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 944, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961). A few judges and writers who find that intervenors can assert new claims seem to rely 
on the proposition that successful applicants become parties. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 
U.S. 54, 68 (1986); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 n.15 (1970); see also FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1920, at 487-92; cf. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 
n.17 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing but refusing to rule on standing issue in this context). 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986); see also supra notes 181-83 and 
accompanying text. See generally Bandes, supra note 11, at 254-55, 312-13. 
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Courts have less reason to demand standing of applicants that 
promise to raise new issues for resolution, as they have already mo-
bilized the judicial machinery. 193 Intervention of right has been char-
acterized as an "exercise of federal ancillary jurisdiction,"194 which 
allows participation by entities that lack independent jurisdiction. Vir-
tually no courts, however, have imposed jurisdictional requirements 
on applicants, especially public interest litigants, apparently because 
there is an existing case or controversy between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants. 195 In short, judges rarely sh.ould apply standing as they 
have to Rule 24(a)(2). 
B. The Preferable Approach to Intervention of Right. 
1. EXPLANATION OF THE PREFERABLE APPROACH 
Standing is crucial, nevertheless, to the intervention inquiry. 196 
The policies that underlie standing help to define the idea of a case and 
to designate proper entities to participate in lawsuits. A case is a device 
for fostering the federal courts' performance of their preeminent duties: 
enunciating public norms in the Constitution and legislation and en-
couraging compliance with the law. The party composition oflitigation, 
therefore, should encompass the individuals and groups that can enable 
the judiciary to fulfill those responsibilities. These 'factors mean that 
in considering intervention requests courts should treat as paramount 
applicants' potential contributions to issue resolution. 
193. See, e.g .. Oregon, 839 F.2d at 638; Sagebrush Rebellion, lnc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 
525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Shapiro, supra note 95, at 754-55. But see Torrington Co. 
v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 1073 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1990). See generally supra note 177. 
194. Bandes, supra note JI, at 311-12. See also c. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL 
COURTS§ 75, at 506 (4th ed. 1983). 
195. My research revealed virtually no cases that mentioned jurisdiction. See Bandes, 
supra note 11, at 252 n. 161 (currently "lower courts rarely discuss why" independent juris-
dictional basis for applicants might or should not be required so treatment of ancillary ju-
risdiction's relevance does not occur); cf. Shapiro, supra note 95, at 726-27 (intervention does 
not raise jurisdictional questions, if plaintiff has standing). A closely split majority of the 
Supreme Court recently suggested that supplemental jurisdiction is much narrower than it 
had previously indicated. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Congress altered 
Finley in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See supra note 177; see also H.R. REP. 
No. 101-734, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (I 988), reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CONG. ADMIN. 
NEws at 7874-75. The statute minimally affects the issue in the text and others in this Article. 
Nearly ail public law litigation is premised on federal question jurisdiction, while exceptions 
from the statute in Rule 24 govern cases based solely on diversity of citizenship. 
196. I rely substantially in this paragraph and in much of this subsection on Professor 
Bandes' valuable, recent work. See Bandes, supra note 11, especially at 227-35, 250-55, 311-
14. I also draw on my earlier work on public interest litigants and the Federal Rules; see 
Tobias, supra note 4; Tobias, supra note 5, and on public participation in agency proceedings, 
see Tobias, supra note 6. 
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The essential intervention inquiry should be whether an applicant 
promises to help resolve issues that warrant consideration before the 
court makes a decision on the merits of the dispute. This may be 
ascertained by examining numerous relevant factors that comprise par-
ticular factual contexts. Although the significance of these considera: 
tions will vary, thus necessitating case-specific ana~ysis, it is possible 
to identify the factors that will be most important and to afford a sense 
of how to treat them. 197 '. 
The most significant consideration is the potential quality of the 
applicant's proposed participation. Is the applicant likely to provide 
expertise, information, or legal or policy per~pectives that contribute 
to a court's understanding of questions already in issue? Correspond-
ingly, will the applicant raise, and help resolve, new questions that the 
judge should consider? An example may be found"in litigation chal-
lenging administrative agency decisionmaking that could have a sig-
nificant impact on many consumers of a specific product or on em-
ployees of a chemical manufacturer. In such a context, a public interest 
litigant-which has run experimental tests on the product or chemicals 
in the workplace and whose members used that product or were ex-
posed to the chemical-may enable the court to appreciate exactly how 
the agency determination and the judge's ultimate decision reviewing 
that determination will affect those individuals. 198 This type of poten-
tially valuable involvement contrasts with the participation of appli-
cants that will only offer experience or viewpoints that the plaintiff or 
the defendant supply, will merely introduce a substantial quantity of 
marginally relevant data, or will simply seek to inject issues that are 
not germane. 199 
A court may want to analyze whether, and if so how much, the 
applicant's involvement promises to improve its substantive decision-
making. For instance, will the potential intervenor help give specificity 
to a Statutory standard that asks which agency choice will best effectuate 
the "public interest"?200 Correspondingly, is the applicant likely to pro-
197. For somewhat similar treatment in the context of compulsory party joinder, see 
Tobias, supra note 5, at 769-92. The treatment below relies partially on administrative practice 
and procedure and public participation in agency proceedings. Many of these concepts are 
transferable from the administrative sphere to courtroom litigation. Moreover, reliance on 
these ideas comports with certain realities in much public law litigation, especially the notions 
that judges are "quasi-administrative" decisionmakers who need the most accurate input to 
render the best determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 
408 (D. Minn. 1972); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
198. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 806 F.2d 1071, 1073, 1078-80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
199. For examples drawn from abortion litigation, see Tobias, supra note 132, at, 
732-34, 757 n. 163; infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text; cf Tobias, supra note 6, at 
946-47 (examples derived from public participation in agency proceedings). 
200. This is what the plaintiffs sought to do in the classic case of Office of Com-
munication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Cf. Tobias, 
supra note 6, at 942 n. 210 (example in governmental agency context). 
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vide facts that other participants do not or cannot, thereby increasing 
the court's understanding of how challenged governmental practices 
allegedly injure citizens .or violate pertinent constitutional com-
mands?201 
A court may encounter difficulty assessing if, and precisely how 
much, a potential intervenor will enhance the quality of judicial de-
terminations. Moreover, insisting that an applicant's input contribute 
substantially to the lawsuit's ultimate disposition is too demanding. 
Thus, the most appropriate inquiry remains whether the potential in-
tervenor's participation promises to help the court take into account, 
view differently, or reconsider relevant issues. 202 
Once the court evaluates what the applicant will offer, it should 
permit intervention by an applicant that clearly will contribute to issue 
resolution, unless the involvement will impose und\le costs on the ju-
dicial system or the original parties, and, even then, the judge should 
seriously consider allowing intervention and conditioning it. 203 If the 
court is less certain that an applicant will facilitate issue resolution, the 
judge should estimate as accurately as possible the value of the appli-
cant's projected participation and attempt to ascertain the disadvan-
tages, especially in terms of expenditures of time, money and effort, 
that intervention will occasion for the civil justice system and the ex-
isting litigants. 204 . 
An important consideration in many cases will be how much the 
intervention is likely to delay the dispute's resolution, potentially un-
dermining judicial economy and prejudicing parties. The court might 
want to consult the nature of the applicant's involvement, what form 
the participation will assume, at which stage of the litigation the in-
volvement will occur, and how much it promises to complicate the 
lawsuit. For example, will such a substantial amount of data be tendered 
or the information be so tangentially related to the central questions 
in dispute that the material inundates the judge, obfuscating, rather 
than clarifying, the issues and protracting the litigation? 205 
201. I mean here an applicant's possible provision of the factual predicate in cases 
involving civil rights or the behavior of law enforcement officials. See generally Meltzer, 
supra note 81; Tobias, supra note 8. 
202. This is similar to the standard that I have suggested should govern awards of 
participant compensation in agency processes. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 950. 
203. "An intervention of right ... may be subject to appropriate conditions or re-
strictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the 
proceedings." FED. R. C1v. P. 24 advisory committee's note; see also Shapiro, supra note 95, 
at 761-62; infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
204. Both the value and costs will be difficult to estimate. See Tobias, supra note 5, 
at 765 n. I 05 (sources on litigation's costs); Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial 
Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 70 I (1978) (helpful 
example of how to estimate value and costs). 
205. For a thorough analysis of these problems in the administrative and courtroom 
1991:415 Standing to Intervene 449 
The. court then should informally balance the benefits and dis-
advantages of granting intervention. 206 This task is problematic, prin-
cipally because it is virtually impossible to assign values to the relevant 
considerations in a way that permits refined comparison. Discerning 
whether certain factors should be treated as benefits or costs may be 
difficult. For instance, if an applicant will provide much new data or 
offer incisive insights on contested legal issues, those contributions 
should be deemed advantages, but the submissions might be considered 
disadvantages, if they were to prolong the dispute's disposition. 207 Even 
when the court can identify benefits and costs with. comparative ease, 
assigning the advantages and disadvantages precise values and balanc-
ing them, when appropriate, may be problematic. For example, exactly 
how much weight should a judge accord to an applicant's proposed 
input that probably will enhance somewhat the court's appreciation of 
certain pertinent, but non-critical, issues in comparison with the ap-
parently significant, although ultimately indeterminate~ expenditures of 
time that the judge and the litigants must devote to the intervention. 
Despite these complications, many circumstances will be clear, and 
courts should be able to make accurate estimates in numerous others. 
For instance, if an applicant appears likely to contribute much to issue 
resolution, this should outweigh all but the greatest disadvantages. In 
contrast, if a potential intervenor promises to submit a large quantity 
of irrelevant material or to consume considerable :time, delaying the 
dispute interminably, intervention probably should be denied or se-
verely conditioned. 
The problems, especially the difficulty of making the assessments 
with exacting precision, mean that in situations where the advantages 
and disadvantages seem relatively comparable, and even in some cir-
cumstances when intervention is more clearly warranted, the court 
should consider the possibility of conditioning intervention. The judge, 
in close cases thus may want to grant intervention motions rather flex-
ibly but adjust the participation permitted to factors, such as the court's 
perceptions of its need for the intervenors' decisional input, the po-
context, with citations to relevant examples, see Stewart, supra note 46, at 1770-81. The 
nature and extent of delay is a controversial question in both contexts. See Resnik, supra 
note 21, at 520-21, 559-60 (courtroom); Tobias, supra note 6, at 947. n. 240 (administrative). 
206. I essentially use "cost" and "disadvantage" synonymously. I am not, however, 
advocating a strict "cost benefit analysis," but rather the type of informal balancing Rule 
I 9(b) requires. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 779-92. 
207. Nonetheless, delay which is attributable to the submission of novel information 
or new arguments that improve a judicial decision cannot fairly be characterized as detri-
mental. Correspondingly, inaccurate judicial determinations which are premised, for example, 
on too little data can be very expensive, by leading to unnecessary appeals or the unwarranted 
expenditure of resources to comply with the judicial mandate. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 
945 n.229, 953. 
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tential quality of contributions, and the time required and available to 
treat the involvement. 
There are inany specific ways of conditioning any intervention 
allowed. For example, a judge could exclude an applicant's information 
that apparently will duplicate data the original parties would offer or 
may require cooperation among multiple applicants that will adopt 
similar policy positions or appoint a representative to speak for 
them. 208 A court may also impose restrictions that track the stages of 
litigation. The judge may use a scheduling order to condition an in-
tervenor's pretrial involvement, might restrict the direct testimony an 
intervenor can present or the cross-examination it can conduct during 
trial, or could permit participation only during the remedial phase. 209 
The court may even limit involvement to certain types of issues, such 
as legal questions. For instance, in litigation challenging the constitu-
tionality of a federal or state statute, implicating issues of constitutional 
or statutory interpretation, the judge might restrict applicant partici-
pation to those questions, thus effectively making the intervenor an 
amicus curiae.210 
2. APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH 
A better understanding of the above-described approach may be 
afforded by applying it in the concrete context of one of the most 
difficult intervention cases. Diamond v. Charles, as discussed earlier, 
presented the questions of whether the trial judge should have granted 
Dr. Diamond's request, premised principally on his status as a pedia-
trician opposed to abortions and as the father of a minor daughter, to 
intervene of right in litigation brought by other physicians challenging 
the constitutionality of a restrictive Illinois abortion statute. 211 A ma-
208. The classic example is United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 
417-20 (D. Minn. 1972). 
209. For helpful discussion and citation to relevant cases, see United States v. South 
Aa. Water Management Dist, 922 F.2d,704, 707, 710-11 (11th Cir. 1991); Sagebrush Re-
bellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 529, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1983) (Wallace, J., dissenting). See 
also Tobias, supra note 132, at 747. 
210. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 764-65 (propriety of this type of judicial treatment 
in context ofabortion litigation); cf Shapiro, supra note 95, at 752-56, 759 (proposing concept 
of "litigating amicus"). 
211. The Supreme Court aptly describes one difficulty with the case: 
The District Court did not indicate whether the intervention was permissive or as 
of right, and it did not describe how Diamond's interests in the litigation satisfied 
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 for intervenor status. 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 58 ( 1986); cf Tobias, supra note 132, at 732-33 (additional 
information on Dr. Diamond's participation in Illinois abortion litigation). Of course, the 
district judge will never have perfect information in the sense of knowing before the fact 
exactly what applicants will contribute. 
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jority of the Supreme Court reserved this question for future decision, 
although it dismissed Diamond's appeal to the Court on the basis of 
standing.212 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, observed that 
the government alone has an interest in enforcing its legislation, and 
he characterized Diamond's interest in securing more patients as overly 
speculative, his interest in physicians' standards as too generalized, his 
interest in protecting his minor daughter as a third party claim, and 
his interest in fetal rights as one only the state could assert.213 
The concurring opinion found that Diamond's alleged interests 
fell "well outside the ambit of Rule 24(a)(2) [which requires] a direct 
and concrete interest that is afforded some degree of legal protec-
tion. "214 Justice O'Connor considered "Diamond's speculative claim 
that his practice" might benefit from the abortion law a "highly con-
tingent financial interest, far less tangible than that of the taxpayer in 
Donaldson," found his interests as a parent and a father indistii:iguish-
able from those of all beneficiaries of criminal statutes, and concluded 
that "only the State has a 'significantly protectable interest' in" de-
fending its criminal law.215 
The majority and concurring opinions facilitate understanding of 
the interests Diamond sought to assert and of th.e justices' views of 
their relevance to standing and intervention. However, the majority 
and concurring opinions have limited applicability to the appropriate 
inquiry: whether Diamond could contribute to issue resolution.216 
Whether Diamond's interest was generalized, speculative, or contin-
gent, for example, does not answer, and has little relevance to, that 
inquiry. 211 
The relative paucity of material available, especially regarding pre-
cisely what Dr. Diamond might have contributed, complicates thor-
. ' 
ough application of the suggested approach. Nonetheless, there is suf-
ficient information to afford a sense of how a trial judge might apply 
212. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68-71. 
213. See id. at 64-69. 
214. See id. at 71, 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
215. See id. at 76. 
216. For helpful analysis of the issues relevant to whether Diamond should have 
been permitted to appeal, see Bandes, supra note 11, at 314. 
217. I am simply saying that there may be little correlation between an applicant's 
technical "interest" in litigation and that applicant's ability to contribute to issue resolution. 
The Supreme Court majority and concurring opinions also seem to emphasize the idea that 
only the state has an interest in prosecuting a person for violating its criminal law or in the 
enforcement of its legislation. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64-65, 76. The preferable way of 
phrasing the inquiry is to ask whether an applicant can contribute to issue resolution, or if 
the interest concept is considered relevant, whether an applicant has an interest in defending 
the constitutionality of a challenged statute. 
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the approach advocated here to the physician's intervention motion.218· 
Dr. Diamond, as a licensed, practicing pediatrician, apparently could 
have provided experience, data, or viewpoints arguably relevant to the 
district court litigation challenging the abortion legislation. 
Several opposing factors, however, dilute the strength of his ap-
parent ability to contribute. Close scrutiny of the major questions at 
issue in the lawsuit reveals that they principally involved questions of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation. These are areas in which 
the Illinois Attorney General and the Cook County State's Attorney, 
both statutorily required to defend the legislation's constitutionality, 
would have special expertise and Diamond would be unlikely to have 
much relevant experience.219 Even as to some of the more tangential 
questions, such as how abortions are conducted, Diamond would have 
had little to offer, because he was opposed to abortions and presumably 
did not perform them. In short, Dr. Diamond probably would have 
provided minimal pertinent expertise, little relevant information, and 
few insights that the parties did not promise to supply. 
A judge, analyzing these factors, could reasonably make a prelim"' 
inary determination that the applicant would not contribute to issue 
resolution. Were the court to reach that conclusion, it would end the 
inquiry and deny intervention of right. Even if the judge initially de-
cided that an applicant may somehow contribute, the court should then 
consider the potential costs of permitting intervention. 
At this juncture, the judge might properly consult some factors 
gleaned from the controversial history of Illinois abortion litigation. A 
review of that litigation reveals that Dr. Diamond had actively partic-
ipated in a number of cases since the mid-l 970s, that he had made few 
substantive contributions to the resolution of pertinent questions, that 
he was not paying the costs of participating in certain suits,220 and that 
he was willing to prolong for a decade the litigation that bears his 
name.221 These considerations could lead the court to question Dia-
218. I rely most on all of the opinions issued in the Diamond litigation and on earlier 
research I conducted on Dr. Diamond's participation in Illinois abortion litigation. See To-
bias, supra note 132, at 732-33; see also Bandes, supra note 11, at 254-55. 
219. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 14, para. 4, 5 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1989); see 
also Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985); Tobias, supra note 132, at 760-61. 
220. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 732 n.6 (documenting active participation); id. 
at 757 n.163 and accompanying text (few contributions); see also Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 
343, 345-48 (7th Cir. 1986) (Diamond not paying costs). 
221. See Tobias, supra note 132, at 733-34. I realize that some ideas in this sentence 
may not necessarily be seen as disadvantages. For example, active participation in abortion 
litigation and prolonging one piece of it for ten years may display an admirable commitment 
to the issue and "concrete adversity." Correspondingly, although Diamond's failure to pay 
the costs of the litigation may evince a lack of commitment or a willingness to "spend someone 
else's money," national entitities, like Diamond's counsel, the Americans United for Life 
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mond's reasons for seeking intervention and even to suspect that he 
was primarily interested in delay or in obstructing plaintiffs' efforts to 
vindicate their rights to reproductive freedom. 222• In any event, the 
judge might find that the pediatrician's intervention would be too costly 
for the justice system and for the original parties. 
Another relevant factor that the judge could have considered is 
the governmental defendants' commitment to defense of the legisla-
tion's constitutionality. In certain situations, applicants may have been 
justifiably concerned about entrusting their hard-fought legislative vic-
tories to the vagaries of courtroom representation by defendants who 
are, after all, elected officials. For instance, some observers accused 
Illinois Attorney General Hartigan of prematurely :settling another Il-
linois abortion case, Turnock v. Ragsdale, and sacrificing the "public 
interest" in stringent abortion regulation, to foster his own guberna-
torial candidacy.223 These considerations might lead a court to question 
the strength of the defendants' commitment to defending the statute, 
a factor that may warrant comparison with the advantages and dis-
advantages of Diamond's participation. 
In short, an informal balancing of the advantages and disadvan-
tages indicates that the coi>ts· of allowing Dr. Diamond's participation 
would have been greater. Intervention could have entailed significant 
disadvantages, especially in terms of time expenditures, with little 
promise that the applicant would have contributed substantially to the 
resolution of any relevant issues in the case. Moreover, the govern-
mental defendants had considerable expertise as to the most important 
questions, although they arguably.lacked.sufficient commitment to the 
defense of the legislation. These factors would seem to favor the denial 
of intervention or perhaps permitting severely conditioned participa-
tion or amicus involvement on certain issues as a hedge against the 
possibility of lukewarm governmental defense. 224 
Legal Defense Fund, and the ACLU, typically finance much of the "local" abortion litigation. 
This representation also illustrates that Diamond might have possessed special legal expertise 
that was not otherwise apparent. I realize as well that what an applicant promises to contribute 
should be more imPortant than prior participation, although the latter certainly has relevance 
in this context. ' 
222. This apparently has been true of some Illinois abortion litigation and certainly 
has been true of such litigation in other states. See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984); see also Tobias, supra note 
132, at 734. 
223. SeeTumock v. Ragsdale, 492 U.S. 916 (1989) Uuris. postponed); see also Illinois 
Accord Approved, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, Al2, Col. I. The reason why Dr. Diamond 
appealed to the Supreme Court was, after all, that the State of Illinois chose not to appeal. 
See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 56. 
224. For an analysis that reaches similar conclusions while. recognizing the benefits 
and disadvantages that are implicated, see Tobias, supra note 132, _at 758-65. 
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3. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE APPROACH 
This approach is preferable and the federal judiciary should im-
plement it for many reasons. Perhaps the most compelling reason is 
that many judges actually have already applied all elements of the 
approach in their intervention of right decisionmaking. Several influ-
ential judges candidly recognized that Rule 24(a)(2) has a discretionary 
dimension, and some courts have exercised this discretion. Indeed, 
Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Leventhal and Judge Spottswood Ro-
binson, remarked that "while the division of Rule 24 (a) and (b) into 
'Intervention of Right' and 'Permissible Intervention' might superfi-
cially suggest that only the latter involves an exercise of discretion by 
the court, the contrary is clearly the case."225 Judge Henry Friendly, 
observing that they "may well have been correct," acknowledged that 
trial courts have considerable discretion under Rule 24(a)(2) and sug-
gested that appellate judges defer to district courts with the "feel of the 
case" when reviewing determinations on conditioning, litigation man-
agement, and intervention of right generally.226 
Numerous courts have also emphasized the contributions that ap-
plicants' expertise or perspectives might make to issue resolution and 
to judicial decisionmaking, apparently recognizing_ the worth of inter-
vention as a mechanism for information gathering and for improving 
substantive determinations. 227 Some have considered the possible prej-
udice to litigants of permitting intervention, while others have found 
party prejudice so significant that they incorporated i~ as a principal 
component when elaborating a four-part timeliness test. 228 Additional 
judges have acknowledged the validity and value of conditioning in-
tervention, integrated that prospect into their Rule 24(a)(2) decision-
making, or creatively conditioned intervenor participation.229 Quite a 
few courts that invoke party prejudice or condition involvement seem 
225. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Accord Washington Elec. 
Coop. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990). 
226. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 991 n.20 (2d Cir. 
1984) (three judges may well have been correct); id. at 990-93 (remaining propositions); see 
also Int'! Paper v. Town of Jay, 887 F.2d 338, 344 (I st Cir. 1989); accord FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
supra note 115, § 1913, at 375-76. 
227. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J., 
concurring); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983); Southeast 
Alaska Conservation Council v. Watson, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1983). But see 
American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City ofChicago,_865 F.2d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1989). 
228. See, e.g .. Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles v. Thorn-
burgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (I Ith Cir. 1989); New Hampshire Insur. Co. v. Greaves, 110 
F.R.D. 549, 552 (D.R.I. 1986). Cf Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 452, 458 (1st Cir. 1983) (undue 
judicial expenditures relevant to timeliness); see also Note, The Timeliness Threat to Inter-
vention of Right, 89 YALE L.J. 586 ( 1980). ' 
229. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380, 
382-83 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. South Fla. Water Management 
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to find important intervention's potential disadvantages, namely de-
lay.230 
A substantial number of courts, in resolving intervention requests, 
has carefully weighed the factors enumerated and other relevant con-
siderations, balancing them as indicated. Many judges have deempha-
sized or relaxed the Rule's four express criteria, while some courts even 
seem to have ignored certain of the requirements. For instance, a few 
Ninth Circuit panels and additional judges have failed to mention the 
interest condition or effectively read it out of Rule 24(a)(2).231 Corre-
spondingly, some members of the bench have accorded decreased sig-
nificance to applicants' need to intervene.232 Numerous judges have 
employed such elastic tests of impairment, inadequate representation 
or timeliness that they have practically eviscerated the criteria.233 
Others have imposed proof burdens so lenient or viewed potential 
intervenors' showings with such sympathy that the applicants easily 
satisfied the Rule's requirements.234 
The approach advocated here is a practical, equitable and sensitive 
recalibration of the longstanding intervention device to the realities of 
modem litigation.235 The approach attempts to make Rule 24(a)(2)'s 
application as responsive as possible to the needs of the principal par-
ticipants in public law cases, namely public interest litigants, judges 
and the· original parties. It recognizes the significance of, and attempts 
to balance as fairly as possible, public interest litigants' strong interest 
Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 707, 710-11 (I Ith Cir. 1991); Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d at 992 
n. 22; Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 529, 530-31 (Wallace, J. dissenting); United States 
v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 417-20 (D. Minn. 1972). · 
230. Indeed concern about the litigation explosion and for efficient operation of the 
federal courts may be the very reason some courts invoked standing. See supra notes 162-
65 and accompanying.iext. 
231. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528; cases cited supra note 134. 
232. See, e.g., Manasota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318, 1323 (I Ith Cir. 1990); 
American Nat'/ Bank & Trust, 865 F.2d at 147. 
233. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826-28 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(impairment and inadequate representation); Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't oflnterior, 
736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984) (inadequate representation); Hodge v. HUD, 862 F.2d 
859 (I Ith Cir. 1989) (timeliness). 
234. For examples of lenient proof burdens, see Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827; Sage-
brush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528. For examples of sympathetic views of applicants' reasons 
for delayed application, see Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles 
v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (I Ith Cir. 1989). Some courts may be treating Rule 
24(a)(2) as I say for reasons slightly different than those that I have suggested. For example, 
the Ninth Circuit panels may deemphasize interest to accommodate their view that "Rule 
24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for intervention." Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 
827. Correspondingly, some courts that accord little significance to applicants' needs may be 
doing so to protect public interest litigants as plaintiffs from delay that applicants could cause. 
See, e.g., Manasota-88, 896 F.2d 1318. 
235. See Bandes, supra note I I, at 250-55, 311-14; cf Marcus, supra note 167, at 664 
(characterization ofJudge Lord's resolution of intervention of right questions in United States 
v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972)). 
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in participating when they seek to intervene, the federal judiciary's 
growing concerns about the litigation explosion and its need for the 
finest decisional information, and the existing parties' desire to mini-
mize the expense of dispute resolution. 236 
The adaptation effectuates the express requirements of Rule 
24(a)(2) and their underlying policies, such as efficient litigation pack-
aging, by, for example, including in one lawsuit as many interested 
parties as can fairly and efficiently be accommodated.237 It also im-
plements the Advisory Committee's intent in drafting the 1966 amend-
ment. The suggested approach clearly carries out the Committee's ad-
monition that application be flexible and pragmatic while recognizing 
that such enforcement is essential in public law cases, because the Com-
mittee crafted the revision primarily for private law litigation.238 Judge 
Leventhal and Judge Friendly explicitly espoused these ideas; they ap-
parently appreciated the complications inherent in writing a rule that 
would govern all types of litigation, especially cases that differed from 
those prevalent in the 1960s, the problem of anticipating future de-
velopments in civil litigation, and the need to adjust Rule 24(a)(2)'s 
application to the new circumstances presented by public law litiga-
tion. 239 Moreover, the approach effectuates the Advisory Committee's 
professed intent in drafting the other two 1966 party joinder amend-
ments, but an intent which it neglected to implement fully in Rule 
24(a)(2): the provision of decisional factors, rather than definitional 
categories, as guides for judicial disposition of party joinder ques-
tions. 240 
The adaptation properly stresses those considerations, like the 
need to provide federal courts with the best possible input, that should 
have greatest importance. The approach appropriately deemphasizes 
the factors that should receive reduced significance. For instance, as 
interests sufficient to satisfy the Rule have become increasingly intan-
gible and the importance of their private or common law character has 
concomitantly diminished, some judges continued insistence on a tra-
ditional, concrete interest has become the modern-day search for prop-
erty in the court's custody that the Advisory Committee abandoned in 
1966 and that its Reporter and prominent judges criticized shortly 
236. The approach is responsive to concerns about the litigation explosion, because 
it seeks to reduce the possibility of multiple litigation and suggests that judges consider 
conditioning the intervention granted. 
237. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also supra note 
136; infra notes 239, 242. · 
238. See supra notes 98, 105-08 and accompanying text. 
239. See Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Hooker Chems. 
& Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984). There is some speculation involved in saying 
what the judges appreciated; however, a fair reading of Nuesse and Hooker Chems. supports 
the textual statement. The approach also honors the Committee's strong, explicit concerns 
about judicial economy and efficient litigation packaging, evidenced specifically, for example, 
in the Committee Note's recommendation that courts condition intervention. 
240. See supra notes 95, 110 and accompanying text. 
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thereafter.241 Correspondingly, the approach ·recognizes the' decreased 
significance that judges should attach to litigant autonomy. Plaintiffs· 
pursuing litigation that implicates public values or that may practically 
prejudice absentees cannot expect to exercise complete control over 
their cases, to dictate the lawsuit's party structure, or to relegate public 
interest litigants to separate, later litigation, even when the entities have 
standing. 242 
The reformulation essentially leaves intact numerous dimensions 
of present Rule 24(a)(2) application. For example, the suggestion that 
courts deny or limit intervention by applicants whose contributions 
would duplicate parties' input implements the adequate representation 
requirement and is sensitive to concerns· about judicial economy.243 
Moreover, the approach should clarify the Rule's enforcement, because 
it suggests that those factors, which many courts ignore or treat im-
plicitly or rarely, be applied more explicitly and more frequently. It 
recommends, for instance, the express judicial consideration of party 
prejudice and more routine conditioning. 244 
The adjustment is advisable as a matter of public policy and im-
plements important policies, in~luded in or derived from the language 
or purposes of rules other than Rule 24(a)(2) and the Rules as a set of 
litigating principles that courts invoke. The approach effectuates Rule 
l's explicit command that the Rules be "construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"245 and signif-
icant policies drawn from the Rules as a whole, particularly their em-
phases on fairness, on merits-based conclusion of lawsuits, and on the 
substance of disputes rather than procedural technicalities. 246 The 1983 
amendments to the Rules lend additional support to this approach.247 
241. See supra text accompanying note 100; Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (1966 amendment eliminated "temptation or need for tangential expeditions 
in search of 'property' "); see also supra note. 231 and accompanying text. 
242. Indeed, efficient litigation packaging and preventing multiple litigation, both of 
which reduce litigant autonomy, were important purposes of the 1966 amendment whose 
significance has only increased over time. See Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Re-
thinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in De.fining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 809 (1989); McCoid, A Single Package For Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
707 (1976); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE,§ 6.10, at 
366, 373 (1985); cf Bandes, supra note 11, at 312 (recognizing importance of adjudicating 
constitutional issues requires reducing litigant autonomy). 
243. An applicant whose contribution would be duplicative is adequately represented. 
See generally supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
244. Judges often seem to consider party prejudice sub si/entio. See generally supra 
note 228 and accompanying text. The validity of conditioning is not entirely clear. See United 
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 992 n.22 (2d Cir. 1984); see also supra 
note 229 and accompanying text. 
245. FED. R. Clv. P. I. 
246. See FED. R. Civ. P. I (fairness); Marcus, supra note 33, at 439 (merits-based 
resolution);. c. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965) (fairness and em-
phasis on substance). 
247. See A. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
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The Advisory Committee, in revising Rules 7, 11, 16 and 26, meant 
to revamp the process of federal civil litigation, streamlining it and 
expediting dispute resolution. 248 The drafters sought to achieve these 
goals by, for instance, enhancing judicial control over cases, especially 
vis-a-vis lawyers, emphasizing that the civil justice system is a public 
resource and decreasing litigant autonomy. The Committee, therefore, 
intended to change the Federal Rules and the litigation process so fun-
damentally that certain precepts, such as intensive litigation manage-
ment, which informed that effort should have applicability beyond the 
provisions specifically amended to Rule 24(a)(2).249 
The approach implements evolving policy notions of the federal 
courts as a public resource and of the proper judicial role in closely 
managing cases and in acquiring necessary decisional input. It also 
draws on transformed conceptualizations of the idea of a case and its 
constituents. A case is both a mechanism for settling private disputes 
and a vehicle for explicating public values and for preventing or cor-
recting government illegality. 250 Its subject matter may be a government 
decision, policy or practice, and the proper participants in a case are 
those that can contribute best to issue resolution. Indeed, intervention 
of right itself now functions not only as a device for protecting absentees 
against practical prejudice but also as an important information-gath-
ering mechanism for enhancing federal judicial decisionmaking. Thus, 
it serves as a valuable complemeni to numerous, existing devices that 
are addressed more explicitly to the judicial need for decisionmaking 
input, such as the appointment of special masters or expert witnesses 
or the designation of amici curiae. 251 
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 
(1984). 
248. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note. See generally A. MILLER, 
supra note 247. For helpful discussion of how the Committee intended to change the Rules 
and the litigation process fundamentally, see Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989); Subrin, supra..note 33. 
I realize that the 1983 amendments and their application have been controversial since their 
effective date. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 8. I also recognize that there are risks in placing 
too much discretion in the federal judiciary, as some argue the 1983 amendments do and as 
the approach proposed may. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 
1987); see also Burbank, supra; Burbank, supra note 39; Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 
1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 927 (1991). Congress 
evinced strong concern about expediting dispute resolution as recently as its last session. See 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title I., 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (civil 
justice expense and delay reduction plans). 
249. For analogous ideas, see Goldberg, supra note 38, at 416-18; Matasar, Redis-
covering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test 
forSupplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1401, 1478-79 (1983). 
250. See Bandes, supra note 11, at 281-89; Chayes, supra note 77, at 4. For discussion 
of Supreme Court opinions that may suggest a different approach, see supra note 177. 
251. See Brazil, supra note 20 (special masters); Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: 
From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 ( 1963 (amici); Chayes, supra note 13, at 
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These new realities have deprived Rule 24(a)(2) of considerable 
substance, diluting the applicability of the core concepts of interest, 
impairment and inadequate representation, to most modem lawsuits. 
The literal terms of the Advisory Committee's quarter-century old 
amendment, aimed at private cases, simply cannot bind judges with 
significantly altered responsibilities to resolve public law litigation. 
When the essential character of much federal civil litigation changes 
so dramatically, the courts must be able to treat the litigation effica-
ciously by adjusting existing Rules to the new circumstances. 252 Many 
federal judges apparently have ascribed importance to similar phenom-
ena in creating a "public rights exception" to compulsory party joinder 
under Rule 19, one of the other two party joinder rules revised in 
1966. 253 Finally, tbe approach effectuates good public policy for eq-
uitable, efficacious court administration by facilitating citizen partici-
pation in litigation. This involvement affords indiv:iduals and groups 
the opportunity to be heard before judges enter decrees that might affect 
them adversely, a concept inherent in the idea of equitable discretion, 
and may increase public accountability for, and acceptance of, govern-
mental decisionmaking. 254 
Congress has expressly subscribed to these public policies. 255 For 
example, it has enacted much legislation intended to promote the active 
involvement of public interest litigants and other members of the public 
in administrative proceedings and courtroom litigation. By generously 
providing participatory possibilities, Congress clearly meant to expand 
federal court access for previously excluded and underrepresented in-
dividuals and groups.256 The many specific expressions of legislative 
intent suggest that courts should apply analogous, more general pro-
1300-01 (other mechanisms). Intervention of right augments these devices; it does not replace 
them. 
252. Courts have similarly adjusted other rules. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 4, at 
296-301 (Rule 8); id. at 332-33 (Rule 60(b)(5)); Tobias, supra note 5 (Rule 19); see also 
Goldberg, supra note 38, at 416-18; Matasar, supra note 249, at 1478-79. 
253. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club 
v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985). These courts recognize, for example, that 
governmental decisions are the subject matter of public law litigation, that those decisions 
affect thousands of geographically dispersed entities that public interest litigants cannot join 
or whose joinder would unduly complicate their litigation, and that there would be losses in 
governmental accountability were the claims dismissed. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 764-65. 
254. See Marcus, supra note 167, at 668 (idea inherent in equitable discretion); supra 
notes 182-83 and accompanying text (public accountability for and acceptance of govern-
mental decisionmaking). 
255. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
256. Congress afforded public interest litigants and citizens standing and intervention 
rights in numerous particular substantive statutes, such as measures aimed at eliminating or 
reducing discrimination and environmental pollution. See, e.g., Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(l982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1986); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U .S.C. § 6972 (1982). See generally Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, ll 0 S. Ct. 482, 486-88 (1989). 
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visions in the Federal Rules, such as Rule 24(a)(2), in ways that facilitate 
the participation of public interest litigants and the broader.publjc.257 
C. Summary 
In short, the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules. and the need 
for efficient, well-informed judicial decisionmaking, support judicial 
enforcement of present Rule 24(a)(2) in accord with the approach sug-
gested. A number of judges may be uncomfortable with certain aspects 
of the approach, finding that some facets conflict with their perceptions 
of the proper judicial role or are otherwise inappropriate.258 Quite a 
few judges may consider the approach problematic, as it is insufficiently 
attentive to the Rule's specific requirements. The approach suggests 
that courts exercise discretion when applying a rule couched in man-
datory terms, 259 deemphasize policies that underlie the express re-
quirements of Rule 24(a)(2),260 and stress concepts that are not ex-
plicitly included in the provision.261 Judges, thus, might be troubled 
because Rule 24(b )(2) expressly states that they are to exercise discretion 
in resolving permissive intervention requests and makes party preju-
dice the exclusive criterion that courts must consider in doing so.262 
257. I am merely saying that the large number of specific expressions of legislative 
intent strongly indicate that Congress favors expansive intervention and that this should 
inform courts' application of Rule 24(a)(2). See also Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 486-88. I· realize, 
of course, that Rule 24(a)( 1) provides for statutory intervention of right and that Congress 
could specifically prescribe intervention of right by regulatory beneficiaries in every substan-
tive statute, but this is an unrealistic view of the legislative process, given, for instance, its 
extremely fragmented nature and the shifting coalitions that coalesce to pass specific statutes. 
Congress also has subscribed more recently to other policies that support the suggested 
approach. Congress, by acquiescing in the 1983 amendments and by passing the Judicial 
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, for example, evinced concern about expeditious dispute 
resolution and efficient litigation packaging. 
258. One basis for objection might be that an aspect seems inconsistent with recent 
Supreme Court opinions that view the idea of a case rather narrowly. See supra note 177. 
259. "Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene .... "FED. R. 
C1v. P. (24)(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
260. This is especially so with regard to applicant need to intervene. See supra notes 
223-24, 232, 236 and accompanying text. 
261. Of particular import are contributions to issue resolution and party prejudice. 
See supra notes 178-83, 197-205, 227-28 and accompanying text. · 
262. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to 
intervene in an action: ... (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common ... In exercising its discretion the 
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduiy delay or prejudice. the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. · 
FED. R. C1v. P. 24 (b)(2). Judges could be concerned because they believe that the approach 
might violate the Advisory Committee's intent when drafting Rule 24(a)(2) in 1966. Even if 
the Committee revised the provision with Rule 24(b) in mind, it is not clear that the drafters 
meant to divest judges of all discretion, and numerous courts have exercised discretion when 
including party prejudice as an integral part of the timeliness test or in their intervention of 
. right decisionmaking more generally. See supra notes 24-25, 228 and. accompanying text. 
Although the drafters did not amend Rule 24(b) in 1966, it is fair to assume that they had 
it in mind. See generally FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 115, § 1911, at 355-56. 
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Given the scope of the suggested changes, some judges may find them 
so fundamental that the recommendations should only be effectuated 
through the formal rule amendment process. 263 fodeed, when civil 
rights plaintiffs recently championed a different, but not entirely in-
apposite, approach to Rule 24(a)(2), the Supreme Court responded that 
the application advocated "would require a rewriting rather than an 
interpretation of' Rules 24 and 19.264 
The Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee and Congress, there-
fore, should expeditiously revise Rule 24(a)(2) to conform with the 
approach suggested here. Formal amendment would afford numerous 
benefits. It would resolve any doubt about judicial authority to imple-
ment the approach espoused, permit full public discussion of the pro-
posal's advisability and of other suggestions for improvement and their 
revision as indicated, and offer the advantage of expressly including in 
the provision any changes adopted. 265 
Notwithstanding the need for Rule 24(a)(2)'s tevision or the ad-
visability of the approach recommended, amendment appears unlikely 
in the near future. For over a quarter century, the Advisory Committee 
has manifested no interest in revision, despite considerable agreement 
that Rule 24(a)(2) was flawed as amended,266 while the Committee has 
recently assigned higher priority to modifying other provisions, such 
as Rule 11 covering sanctions and Rule 56 governing summary judg-
ment. 267 Moreover, the Supreme Court has evinced little concern for 
263. This is the process in which the Advisory Committee develops proposals, cir-
culates them for public comment, and finalizes them for submissi~n to the Supreme Court 
which, if it approves or modifies the Committee's recommendation and Congress does not 
modify the Court's action, amends the Rule: See 28 U.s:c. §§ 2072-74 ( 1988); see also Lewis, 
The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 1507 (1987); Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and 
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991). 
264. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 767 ( 1989). Plaintiffs asked the Court to require 
absentees that might be adversely affected by entry of a consent decree in Title VII litigation 
to intervene rather than require plaintiffs to join absentees under Rule 19. See generally 
Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislaiive Response, (forthcoming 
1991 U. ILL. L. REV.); Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1557 (1990). 
265. Most of the public policies that support the suggested approach also support 
courts' authority to implement it absent formal amendment. See, 'e.g., supra notes 255-57 
and accompanying text (explicit indications of Congressional intent augment considerable 
existing judicial authority mentioned in this piece); cf Chambers v,. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 
2123 (1991) (courts have broad inherent authority to manage dockets even in certain areas 
specifically covered by statute or federal rule); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 
871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (courts have broad implied power to manage their dockets). 
But cf Comment, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1495, 1510-13 ( 1989). Although the ideas analyzed strongly support the exercise of 
authority, there are some relatively convincing arguments against its exercise. Nonetheless, 
additional discussion is beyond·the scope of this piece. 
266. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (flawed as amended). 
267. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 344 
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public interest litigants in its recent opinions,268 and neither the Com- . 
mittee nor the Court has shown much interest in revising the Federal 
Rules in ways that would be more solicitous of public interest litigants' 
needs.269 Although Congress has passed many substantive, procedural, 
and fee-shifting statutes that facilitate the active involvement of public 
interest litigants in federal civil litigation,270 it rarely has been suffi-
ciently interested to focus on the revision of one rule. 271 
Because the Supreme Court and Congress are not likely to revise 
Rule 24(a)(2) soon, the courts will have to resolve intervention requests 
pursuant to the current Rule. In treating motions to intervene, judges 
should follow the approach recommended above. Courts that disagree 
with any aspects of the approach should selectively apply those ele-
ments they deem proper. For example, many courts probably will con-
sider appropriate the recommendations that respond to the litigation 
explosion, perhaps finding them logical extensions of the judicial econ-
omy concept, which clearly underlies Rule 24(a)(2). In contrast, the 
possibility that a court might grant intervention to an applicant lacking 
such an interest that could contribute substantially to issue resolution 
( 1990) (possible amendment of Rule 11 ); COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted in 137 
F.R.D. _ (1991). 
268. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. 
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 ( 1989); see Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. 
L. REV. I 05, 122 ( 1991 ); Tobias, Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223, 229-30 ( 1991 ); 
see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 317 n. 284. 
269. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 301-14 (lack of solicitude for civil rights 'plaintiffs 
in revising Rule 11 in 1983 and abortive attempts to amend Rule 68 in 1983 and 1984). 
270. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
( 1982); see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
271. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 293, 337-40. In 1983, Congress did reject the Court's 
suggestions for revising Rule 4 and amended the provision statutorily. See Changes in Federal 
Summons Service Under Amended Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 96 F.R.D. 
81 (1983); cf Burbank, supra note 29, at 1018-20 (documenting increased Congressional 
willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rules and amendments governing evidence and 
civil, criminal and appellate procedure). Congress also has evinced greater interest in the 
rules revision process recently. See, e.g., Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642; H. R. REP. No. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 
22-27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 5983-87. The civil 
rights area affords two telling indications of why Congress is unlikely to revise· Rule 24. 
Congress only recently showed interest in the 1983 amendment of Rule 11, although con-
siderable evidence indicated that it was seriously disadvantaging civil rights plaintiffs. See 
Tobias, supra note 8. Moreover, Congress was unable to override President Bush's veto of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990. This happened, even though the measure was a tepid version 
of the bill initially introduced and had the nearly unanimous support of the powerful civil 
rights lobby. Moreover, there was substantial need to reinstate Congressional intent that the 
federal judiciary facilitate the vindication of fundamental civil rights by discrimination vic-
tims, an intent that narrow Supreme Court interpretations had eroded. See President's Veto 
Of Rights "Measure Survives By One Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, Al, col. 3; cf New 
Battle Looming as Democrats Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991 
(strong, new legislation introduced in l02nd Congress). 
1991:415 Standing to Intervene 463 
but deny intervention to an absentee having a traditional interest that 
would contribute little may prove too much for a number of judges. 272 
Courts that employ the aspects of the suggested approach with which 
they agree should integrate that enforcement with application that is 
tailored more specifically to the Rule's express terms and embodies the 
intervention of right jurisprudence many courts have developed.273 
Even judges who reject the approach in its entirety should seriously 
consider abandoning the inadvisable imposition of standing require-
ments criticized above while pragmatically applying the Rule's explicit 
phrasing which affords sufficient flexibility to resolve intervention re-
quests similarly to the suggested approach. 274 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Numerous federal circuit and district courts have required inter-
vention applicants to satisfy standing or certain of its components. 
Their invocation of standing has been inadvisable. Nonetheless, the 
policies that underlie standing are integral to reformulating intervention 
of right, because they help to define the idea of a case, the appropriate 
parties to participate in it, and the proper judicial role in resolving 
public law litigation. The approach to standing and to Rule 24(a)(2) 
suggested here is a pragmatic, equitable recalibration of the intervention 
procedure to the realities of modern lawsuits. If courts apply it, they 
will at once enhance the quality of their decisionmaking and realize 
judicial economy. 
272. I am not advocating these results, although they could occur, albeit rarely, under 
the approach suggested. 
273. See supra notes 225-34 and accompanying text. The way courts integrate the 
enforcement will depend on many considerations, such as how many, and which, aspects of 
the approach they want to apply, how flexibly they wish to enforce the Rule's four require-
ments, and the facts that are present in specific contexts. For instance, a judge who agrees 
with the central facets of the approach might grant intervention to an applicant that promised 
to contribute greatly to issue resolution, especially if there were some prospect of inadequate 
representation. See generally United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968, 983 
(2d Cir. 1984). In comparison, a judge who is less enamored of the approach may want to 
apply the Rule's requirements in light of the approach, perhaps finding sufficient, for example, 
the type of intangible interest public interest litigants frequently assert. See supra notes 11, 
I 00-02 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra notes 98, I 00-02, 225-26 and accompanying text. These judges might 
wish, for instance, to read the Rule's criteria literally and apply parts of the approach only 
when the four criteria yield unclear conclusions. 
